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ABSTRACT 
There is debate in the weapons of mass destruction and bioterrorism literature over 
whether the threat from smallpox is exaggerated or realistic; however, there has been 
insufficient evaluation of the factors that indicate whether the threat is valid or 
overblown.  Insufficient weight has been given to whether there are groups or individuals 
who are capable or have demonstrated the intent to use smallpox as a weapon, which 
should be key factors in evaluating the level of threat posed by the virus.   
To address the issue of the gap in the specific risk assessment of a smallpox 
attack, the following issues will be considered: (1) capability––whether smallpox is a 
realistic agent for terrorists to use; (2) motivation––what types of terrorists might pursue 
smallpox as a bioweapon; and (3) deterrence––whether current U.S. and international 
policies are likely to impact this decision. 
 I conclude that the threat the United States faces from a smallpox attack is more 
remote than is implied by the amount of concern it generates in reports and preparedness 
exercises.  Terrorists are unlikely to be able to master the acquisition, production, 
weaponization and dissemination of the virus, and would likely pursue other types of 
weapons. 
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A. SMALLPOX AS A THREAT 
There is debate in the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and bioterrorism 
literature over whether the threat from smallpox is exaggerated or realistic.1  The debate 
among novices and experts alike over the actual level of threat presented by smallpox 
reappears periodically each time government reports, congressional testimony, or 
terrorism preparedness exercises mention the virus as a possible terrorist weapon or 
assess that certain terrorists or states could have bioterrorism capabilities.  Surprisingly, 
despite the recurrence of the debate, there has been insufficient evaluation of the factors 
that indicate whether such concerns are valid or overblown.   
Because the ramifications of a bioterror attack would be severe, there are many 
alarmist “what if” or “worst case” stories circulating in both academic literature and the 
mainstream media about bioterrorism in general.  Yet, there has been little evaluation of 
the factors that indicate whether such concerns related specifically to smallpox are valid.  
Generalization across bioterror agents often occurs, causing people to assume that a 
threat from bioterror implies a threat from smallpox.  This contributes to the perception 
that a threat exists without necessarily showing that one does.  Insufficient weight has 
been given to whether there are groups or individuals who are capable or have 
demonstrated the intent to use smallpox as a weapon, which should be key factors  in 
evaluating the level of threat posed by the virus.   
To address the issue of the gap in the specific risk assessment of a smallpox 
attack, I will study whether terrorists could or would be able to carry out a biological 
                                                 
1Martin Enserink, “How Devastating Would a Smallpox Attack Really Be?” Science 296, no. 5573 
(May 31, 2002): 1592–1595;  J. Michael Lane and Lila Summer, “Smallpox as a Weapon for 
Bioterrorism,” in Bioterrorism and Infectious Agents: A New Dilemma for the 21st Century, ed. I.W. Fong 
and Kenneth Alibek (New York: Springer, 2005), 156–158;  Martin Weiss, Peter Weiss, Glenn Mathisen, 
and Phyllis Guze, “Confronting Biological Weapons: Rethinking Smallpox,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 
39, no. 11 (December 1, 2004): 1668–1672;  Ben Harder, “The Vaccinia Dilemma,” Science News 163, no. 
14 (April 5, 2003): 218–220; Peter B. Merkle, “Smallpox and Public Health: A Reality Check,” Science 
298 (October 4, 2002), 57. 
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attack using smallpox, whether they would be likely to prefer this method over their 
alternative options (if they were able to master it), and what factors should be considered 
when making this evaluation.  I will address the question of the extent to which the 
United States should be concerned with the threat of terrorist actors using smallpox as a 
weapon of bioterrorism, focusing specifically on whether such protection is necessary 
based on: (1) whether smallpox is a realistic agent for terrorists to use; (2) what types of 
terrorists might pursue it as a bioweapon; and (3) whether current U.S. policies are likely 
to impact this decision.   
I will argue that the threat the United States faces from a smallpox attack is more 
remote than is implied by the amount of concern it generates in reports and preparedness 
exercises.  Terrorists are unlikely to be able to master the acquisition, weaponization and 
dispersal of the virus, and would likely pursue more conventional types of weapons. 
1.  Smallpox Has Been Eradicated; Is It Still a Concern? 
In 1980, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced a major global 
triumph: smallpox, a devastating and extremely contagious disease that had plagued 
mankind for thousands of years, had been eradicated.  No longer would humans suffer the 
fear of contracting this highly lethal disease or the risks from the vaccination to protect 
against it.  Doctors, scientists, and governments from around the world agreed either to 
destroy their remaining stocks of live smallpox virus, or to transfer them to one of two 
highly controlled laboratories in the Soviet Union or in the United States of America.  
There the virus would remain secured, yet available to fulfill future scientific needs.2  
The only remaining declared stores of the smallpox virus today are held at the State 
                                                 
2 Martin Enserink and Richard Stone, “Dead Virus Walking,” Science 295, no. 5562 (March 15, 2002): 
2001; Harder, “The Vaccinia Dilemma,” 218–220; Michael Scardaville, “Public Health and National 
Security Planning: The Case for Voluntary Smallpox Vaccination,” The Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, no. 1616 (December 6, 2002): 1–3. 
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Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology in Koltsovo, Russia, and at the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia.3 
In the years since eradication, bioterrorism has become a growing concern.  In 
1997, the Department of Defense concluded in its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
that biological weapons are a “likely condition of future warfare.”4  Two years later, the 
Secretary of Defense published an article in The Washington Post in which he mentioned 
his worry that foreign militaries might still possess smallpox.5  D.A. Henderson, an 
expert in smallpox epidemiology who was instrumental in the WHO eradication program, 
maintains that the September 2001 terrorist attacks were a further wake-up call for those 
concerned about smallpox.  He cited as proof that, in contrast to the lack of attention paid 
to Smallpox and Its Eradication at the time of its publication in 1988, after the 2001 
attacks, “remaining copies were quickly sold out.”6  In 2002, President George W. Bush 
announced the National Smallpox Vaccination Campaign and public opinion polls 
showed concern over the threat posed by smallpox attack.7  Both bioterrorism in general, 
and smallpox specifically, were becoming greater areas of concern for government 
officials and the public.   
Part of this renewed concern surrounding smallpox comes from the suspicion that 
live smallpox virus existed outside the two authorized laboratories.  There have been 
                                                 
3 Alan Zelicoff and Michael Bellomo, Microbe: Are We Ready For The Next Plague? (New York, NY: 
AMACOM, 2005), 111; Jonathan B. Tucker, Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox (New 
York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001), 176; Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling 
True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World –Told From the Inside by the 
Man Who Ran It (New York: Random House, 1999), 117, 148. 
4 Al Mauroni, Chemical and Biological Warfare, 2nd ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2007), 
xvii. 
5 William S. Cohen, “Preparing for a grave new world,” Washington Post, July 26, 1999. 
6 Henderson, Smallpox: The Death of a Disease, 252. 
7 Robert Blendon, John Benson, Catherine DesRoches, and Melissa Hermann, “Survey Project on 
Americans’ Response to Biological Terrorism: Study 3: Public Attitudes About the Threat of a Smallpox 
Attack” (Harvard School of Public Health, June 5, 2002). http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/research/horp/ 
project-on-the-public-and-biosecurity/ (accessed May 17, 2011). 
 4
indications that North Korea, Iraq, and Israel possess illegal stores of the smallpox virus.8  
Other sources cite al Qaeda or Iran as potential sources of biological weapons programs.9  
Even more worrying are the reports from a high-level former Soviet military scientist 
named Ken Alibek who was intimately involved in the huge smallpox weaponization 
program that the Soviet government secretly operated for years.  He suspects that all 
instances of the virus and the scientists involved in its research were not accounted for 
after the fall of the Soviet Union.10  If the virus is present outside the known controlled 
environments, or if it is being studied in ways that violate international agreements, it is 
possible that terrorists could use it to cause widespread harm.11   
Unauthorized storage and research is dangerous because much of the population 
in the United States is no longer protected from smallpox.  Widespread vaccination in the 
United States ceased in 1972 when the threat from smallpox was determined to be small 
enough not to warrant the continued use of what was commonly accepted to be a vaccine 
with high risk of serious side effects.12  Furthermore, post-vaccination immunity to 
smallpox wears off over the years.13  Those who were once fully protected are now 
vulnerable.  Additionally, because it has been over three decades since the last case of 
smallpox was seen by medical professionals and “[f]ew physicians are alive today who 
                                                 
8 House Committee on International Relations, Russia, Iraq, and Other Potential Sources of Anthrax, 
Smallpox, and Other Bioterrorist Weapons: Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, 
107th Cong., 1st sess., December 5, 2001, 7;  Barton Gellman, “Four Nations Thought to Possess Smallpox; 
Iraq, North Korea Named, Two Officials Say,” Washington Post, November 5, 2002;  Lane and Summer, 
“Smallpox as a Weapon for Bioterrorism,” 158.   
9 Barton Gellman, “Revealing a Reporter’s Relationship with Secrecy and Sources,” Neiman Reports 
58, no.2 (Summer 2004): 45; Joby Warrick, “Iran Said to be Producing Bioweapons,” Washington Post, 
May 15, 2003. 
10 Tim Weiner, “Soviet Defector Warns of Biological Weapons,” New york times, February 25, 1998; 
Lane and Summer, “Smallpox as a Weapon for Bioterrorism,” 156; House Committee on International 
Relations, Russia, Iraq, and Other Potential Sources of Anthrax, Smallpox, and Other Bioterrorist Weapon, 
8–9, 12.   
11 William Broad and Judith Miller, “Report Provides New Details of Soviet Smallpox Accident,” 
New york times, June 15, 2002. 
12 Brenda J. McEleney, “Smallpox: A Primer,” in The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm, ed. Jim A. 
Davis and Barry R. Schneider (Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 
2002), 146–149. 
13 Donald A. Henderson, “The Looming Threat of Bioterrorism,” Science 283, no. 5406 (February 26, 
1999): 1281. 
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have seen cases outside of a textbook,”14 diagnosis and containment are likely to be slow.  
This could be seen as a benefit to terrorists seeking to spread disease. 
Former Senator Bill Frist, M.D., has written a book in an attempt to educate the 
public about biological terrorism from to his unique perspective of being both a medical 
doctor and a legislator.  In his book, he chooses to include only biological agents that 
have “been identified by our intelligence and public health experts as a potential 
bioterrorist weapon.”15  Smallpox is among them.  His answer to the question of whether 
smallpox could really be used as a biological weapon is that “[t]he threat must be taken 
very seriously….  [I]t’s suspected that nations with bioterror programs, including Iraq 
and North Korea, may have gained access to the virus, increasing the likelihood that it 
could fall into the hands of terrorists.”16  Although he does not elaborate on the sources 
of these suspicions, it is clear that he intends the reader to feel his claims are legitimate 
based upon his knowledge gained as a member of Congress. 
The concerns that terrorists could possibly have acquired stores of smallpox or 
could be able to manufacture the virus in a laboratory, combined with the fact that the 
United States of America has a significantly vulnerable population, puts the country at 
risk if there are actually terrorists who are motivated to orchestrate this type of attack.  
The actual level of this risk should be determined by the capability and intentions of these 
terrorist actors.  Is the threat of the occurrence of a smallpox attack exaggerated 
unnecessarily simply because of these vulnerabilities and the potentially grave 
consequences of such an attack?  Are non-state actors capable of successfully meeting the 
technical laboratory and safety requirements required to complete an attack of this level 
of sophistication?  Are there groups in the world that would be likely to choose this type 
of attack over their conventional alternatives?  Is it likely that the threat of the United 
States’ retaliation would deter them?  If smallpox is a threat, what is the level of risk?  
Although some of these questions have been considered and debated surrounding the 
                                                 
14 D.A. Henderson, Smallpox: The Death of a Disease: The Inside Story of Eradicating a Worldwide 
Killer (New York: Prometheus Books, 2009), 32. 
15 Bill Frist, When Every Moment Counts:  What You Need to Know about Bioterrorism from the 
Senate’s Only Doctor (Lantham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), xiv. 
16 Ibid., 75. 
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general topic of bioterrorism, there has not been sufficient evaluation of these questions 
devoted specifically to the study of the use of smallpox as an agent of bioterror and to the 
degree of risk of a smallpox attack. 
To address the questions of whether a smallpox attack is realistically something 
that the United States should be concerned with and whether it is indeed suitable as a 
weapon of bioterror, I will begin with an overview of the characteristics of the disease 
and the virus responsible for it, and its method transmission. 
2.  Background of the Disease 
The Variola virus, more commonly called smallpox, had been continually 
spreading disfigurement and death from person to person for at least the last 3,500 years 
until it was stopped from spreading beyond Ali Maow Maalin in Somalia in 1977.17  He 
was the last person to contract smallpox naturally.  Because smallpox is a virus, it 
requires a living host to reproduce.  Humans are the only organisms that meet this 
particular virus’ requirements; there are no reservoirs for the virus in nature.18  This 
characteristic allowed eradication to be successful. 
Before the eradication milestone, epidemics commonly killed approximately 
thirty percent of those who contracted the disease.19  The disease’s profound impact was 
recorded in Japan between the years 735 and 737 when thirty percent—and in some 
                                                 
17 Henderson, Smallpox: The Death of a Disease, 240. 
18 Irwin Sherman, Twelve Diseases That Changed Our World (Washington, D.C.: American Society 
of Microbiology Press, 2007), 56; Lane and Summer, “Smallpox as a Weapon for Bioterrorism,” 148. 
19 Although fatality rate is not constant across epidemics or across different types of smallpox, the 
range is often described as anywhere from 20% to 60%, with 30 to 40% being the most commonly cited.  
See: Richard Crowell, “Likely Threat Pathogens in Biological Terrorism,” in Countering Biological 
Terrorism in the U.S.: An Understanding of Issues and Status, ed. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 
(Arlington, VA: Oceana, 1999), 136; Donald Henderson and Luciana Borio, “Smallpox and Monkeypox,” 
in Tropical Infectious Diseases: Principles, Pathogens, and Practice, 2nd ed., ed. Richard Guerrant, David 
Walker, and Peter Weller (Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier, 2006), 621; Lane and Summer, “Smallpox as a 
Weapon for Bioterrorism,” 147; U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, Smallpox: Technical Background on the 
Disease and its Potential Role in Terrorism, by Frank Gottron, CRS Report RS21288 (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, January 10, 2003), 1; Thomas Mack, “Smallpox in 
Europe, 1950–1971,” Journal of Infectious Diseases 125 no. 2 (February 1972): 168; J.N. Hays, Epidemics 
and Pandemics: Their Impacts on Human History (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 31; Susan Scott 
and Christopher Duncan, eds., Human Demography and Disease (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 281. 
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places sixty percent—of the population was killed in a smallpox epidemic.20  Similar 
devastation occurred in Iceland in 1241 when 20,000 members of the country’s 70,000 
did not survive the virus and again in 1707 when 25 percent of the population died of 
smallpox in two years (making smallpox responsible for two-thirds of all deaths in those 
years).21  At about the same time, two-thirds of the population of Greenland succumbed 
to the disease.22  In the sixteenth century when smallpox began to spread in North and 
South America, “[m]ortality rates of 50 to 80 percent were common.”23   
In London, census data and Bills of Mortality revealed a mean fatality rate of 
nearly 19 percent with a range from nine to 36 percent after the 1720 epidemic.24  Shortly 
thereafter, “[i]noculation against smallpox was more widely administered… and 
vaccination was introduced in 1796 and became compulsory for infants in 1853.”25  Even 
with the introduction of these protective measures, in the eighteenth century, cities in 
Europe such as London and Copenhagen typically experienced a minimum of between 
300 and 350 deaths per 100,000 people each year and smallpox reached the milestone of 
surpassing “plague, leprosy, and syphilis as the continent’s foremost pestilence.”26  
During the same time period, 10 percent of all Swedish infants were dying as a result of 
the disease.27  The most serious outbreak in the West in the nineteenth century occurred 
in Europe between 1870 and 1876, killing 500,000 people.28 
D.A. Henderson summarizes how these historical statistics relate to modern 
vulnerability to the disease using North America as an example:   
                                                 
20 J.N. Hays, Epidemics and Pandemics: Their Impacts on Human History (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, 2005), 31. 
21 Henderson, Smallpox: The Death of a Disease, 39; Hays, Epidemics and Pandemics, 131. 
22 Susan Scott and Christopher Duncan, eds., Human Demography and Disease (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 281. 
23 Henderson, Smallpox: The Death of a Disease, 40. 
24 Scott and Duncan, eds., Human Demography and Disease, 281. 
25  Ibid., 172. 
26 Donald Hopkins, The Greatest Killer: Smallpox in History (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 
2002), 32, 41; Hays, Epidemics and Pandemics, 151–152. 
27 Hays, Epidemics and Pandemics, 151–152. 
28 Ibid., 287. 
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During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, none of the cities in 
North America were large enough to sustain transmission.  Instead, 
smallpox was periodically reintroduced, resulting in large epidemics every 
seven to twelve years….  But in remote and rural areas, decades might 
pass without a trace of smallpox.  It became apparent that the longer the 
period of freedom from smallpox, the larger the number of vulnerable 
people and the more disastrous the epidemic.29 
Smallpox survivors were left scarred and often blind, but immune from re-
infection.30  Because of this immunity, smallpox could only continue to be transmitted as 
long as there were previously uninfected people available in close proximity to serve as 
hosts for the virus.  When smallpox reached an area that had never been infected, or that 
had experienced the passage of enough time since the last outbreak, the disease would 
rage.31  These fatality rates and epidemiological patterns from the past are relevant today 
because in the modern era, most people are not vaccinated to protect against smallpox, 
and those who were vaccinated in the past likely remain only partially immune.  If 
smallpox were reintroduced and not immediately contained today, widespread epidemics 
similar to those in the past would be a realistic possibility. 
3. Virus Characteristics 
Those who study biological weapons have noted that “[s]ome factors that are 
important for microorganisms to be used as biological weapons are virulence, infectivity, 
stability/ruggedness, ease of producibility, and ease of controllability.”32		Several of these 
characteristics clearly apply to smallpox. 
Smallpox is a virus of the Orthopox genus and the Poxviridae family, also known 
by the scientific name of Variola.  It is easy to grow, can be dried to make it susceptible 
                                                 
29 Henderson, Smallpox: The Death of a Disease, 43. 
30 Irwin Sherman, Twelve Diseases That Changed Our World (Washington, D.C.: American Society 
of Microbiology Press, 2007), 56; Rohit Puskoor and Geoffrey Zubay, “Smallpox,” in Agents of 
Bioterrorism: Pathogens and their Weaponization, ed. Geoffrey Zubay (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), 240. 
31 Sherman, Twelve Diseases That Changed Our World, 56–57. 
32 Kathleen Vogel and Sonia Ben Ouagrham, “Conversion at Stepnogorsk: What the Future Holds for 
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to breakdown by heat, and can be transmitted via aerosol means.33  Furthermore, it is 
“relatively resistant to environmental conditions, persisting in aerosolized form for up to 
1 week and in crusts for several years.”34  Smallpox’s genome is large, very stable, and 
“is theoretically amenable to modification.”35  Modification of the genome means that the 
virus could be altered by scientists to enhance these characteristics.36   
The facts that smallpox is a severe disease that is transmissible between humans, 
has a stable genome, and can survive in the environment make it suitable for potential use 
as a bioweapon.  Some have claimed that these attributes make Variola “attractive as a 
terrorist weapon.”37  Its attractiveness to terrorists remains to be examined; however, its 
viral characteristics do make Variola amenable to use as a biological weapon. 	
The attributes of smallpox have been assessed by a working group at Johns 
Hopkins convened in 1998 to develop a report about the most concerning biological 
agents that, if used as bioweapons, “had the potential to cause catastrophic epidemics,”38 
or that “were serious enough to threaten the integrity and functioning of the 
government.”39  Smallpox warranted inclusion in the list based upon “its high fatality 
rate, its capacity to spread widely, the large number of vulnerable people, the lack of 
available vaccine to curtail outbreaks—and, not least, the high ranking given to it by 
Soviet biological weapons experts.”40  Academics and public health officials have rated 
the characteristics of the smallpox virus as more of a concern than others, from the 
standpoint of potentially severe consequences of an outbreak. 
                                                 
33 Lane and Summer, “Smallpox as a Weapon for Bioterrorism,” 148; Crowell, “Likely Threat 
Pathogens in Biological Terrorism,” 138. 
34 Puskoor and Zubay, “Smallpox,” 240. 
35 Lane and Summer, “Smallpox as a Weapon for Bioterrorism,” 148; Puskoor and Zubay, 
“Smallpox,” 247. 
36 Selgelid, “A Tale of Two Studies,” 35; Bloche, “Rogue Science,” 1263; Puskoor and Zubay, 
“Smallpox,” 247; Joshua Epstein et al., Toward a Containment Strategy for Smallpox Bioterror, 38–39; 
Lane and Summer, “Smallpox as a Weapon for Bioterrorism,” 148. 
37 Lane and Summer, “Smallpox as a Weapon for Bioterrorism,” 148. 
38 Henderson, Smallpox: The Death of a Disease, 279. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 279–280. 
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4. Disease Characteristics 
The Variola virus is found in two forms: Variola minor and Variola major.  
Variola minor causes a less severe form of the disease with much higher survival rates; 
for example, in a 1920s outbreak of Variola minor in Switzerland, of over 5,000 cases in 
three years, there were only ten fatalities.41  In the past, 1 percent or less of those who 
contracted Variola minor died as a result of the disease.42  Survival of Variola minor 
provides lifelong immunity from all forms of Variola.   
Variola major, on the other hand, is much more debilitating, in terms of fever, 
rash, and eventual fatality.43  Variola major is responsible for “four major clinical types 
of smallpox: the ordinary type, the modified type, the flat type, and the hemorrhagic 
type.”44  Ninety percent of smallpox cases are ordinary-type Variola major.45  Of the four 
clinical types, the hemorrhagic form is the most severe, the most transmissible, kills the 
fastest, and has a nearly 100 percent fatality rate even among vaccinated individuals.46  
Which clinical type a person contracts depends on the individual’s response, not on the 
virus, and patients do not necessarily develop the same form as the individual from whom 
they were infected.47  All forms of Variola major, hereafter simply referred to as Variola 
or smallpox, will be the focus of this paper, as, comparatively, Variola minor’s 
characteristics makes it an unlikely candidate to be preferred as a bioweapon.48   
From the time smallpox is inhaled and begins to replicate inside the infected 
person’s cells, several days will pass before any symptoms are felt; this is called the 
                                                 
41 Hopkins, The Greatest Killer: Smallpox in History, 97. 
42 Henderson and Borio, “Smallpox and Monkeypox,” 624. 
43 Ibid., 626. 
44 Puskoor and Zubay, “Smallpox,” 240. 
45 Shmuel Shapira, Jeffrey Hammond, and Leonard Cole, eds., Essentials of Terror Medicine (New 
York, NY: Springer, 2009), 203. 
46 Henderson and Borio, “Smallpox and Monkeypox,” 629; Shapira, Hammond, and Cole, eds., 
Essentials of Terror Medicine, 204; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response, “Smallpox Fact Sheet: Smallpox Disease Overview,” 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp (accessed February 10, 2012). 
47 Lane and Summer, “Smallpox as a Weapon for Bioterrorism,” 149. 
48 Ibid., 147. 
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incubation period.  Twelve to fourteen days is the average incubation period, with a range 
of seven to seventeen days.49  A person is not contagious during this time.50  For two to 
four days after the end of the incubation period, people are sometimes contagious and 
begin to experience initial symptoms of the disease.51  Symptoms that are expressed 
during this time period begin with: 
Malaise, fever, rigors, vomiting, headaches and backaches; 15 percent of 
patients develop delirium.  Some 2 to 3 days later, an enanthem [rash on a 
mucous membrane] appears concomitantly with a discrete rash about the 
face, hands and forearms.  The rash then spreads to the trunk over the next 
week, and lesions progress quickly from macules to papules, eventually to 
pustular lesions.  From 8 to 14 days after infection, the pustules form 
scabs which leave depressed depigmented scars upon healing.52 
In fatal cases, these symptoms are usually followed by death between the first and second 
weeks of illness.53   
Smallpox’s initial symptoms and incubation periods are relevant to the decision of 
whether to choose the virus as a bioterror agent.  Because one who becomes infected with 
smallpox does not immediately display any outward symptoms, a terrorist who has 
conducted an attack would be provided with time to escape the scene of the smallpox 
release. 
The fact that the disease has no other potential reservoirs in nature solves part of 
the attribution dilemma faced by other potential biological weapons;54 that is, since any 
outbreak of smallpox can no longer be attributed to natural causes, a terrorist attack 
                                                 
49 Frederick Sidell et al., Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook, 2nd ed. (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information 
Group, 2002), 207; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response, “Smallpox Fact Sheet: Smallpox Disease Overview,” 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp (accessed February 10, 2012). 
50 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response, 
“Smallpox Fact Sheet: Smallpox Disease Overview,” 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp (accessed February 10, 2012). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Sidell et al., Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook, 207. 
53 Henderson and Borio, “Smallpox and Monkeypox,” 627. 
54 Anne Clunan, “Identifying Biological Agents, Characterizing Events, and Attributing Blame,” in 
Terrorism, War, or Disease: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, ed. Anne Clunan, Peter Lavoy, 
and Susan Martin (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 8–11. 
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would be implicated as soon as smallpox was definitively diagnosed.  Standard 
epidemiological methods for investigating infectious disease origin and spread can be 
used in a smallpox outbreak, although their effectiveness will depend on details of 
dissemination:  
The expected outcome resulting from this form of release [spreading 
smallpox through the air] would most likely be large numbers of cases 
with clustered onsets.  Establishing epidemiologic association among 
these cases could be problematic, depending on the site and extent of virus 
dispersion.  If introduced through intentionally infected persons, the origin 
of the virus (i.e., the index case) and the extent of the outbreak could 
likely be tracked using standard epidemiologic and laboratory methods.55   
Epidemiological methods that are currently in use can track the disease’s spread 
and attempt to determine its source, but the characteristics of the disease are such that this 
investigation would not take place until multiple days after the attack had taken place.  If 
a terrorist group did not claim credit for its attack, smallpox’s long incubation period 
could help it escape detection as the source.  Some doctors have assessed that due to the 
disease’s initial stages presenting with a rash similar to chickenpox, in conjunction with 
the fact that smallpox is unlikely to be suspected due to its status as an eradicated disease, 
the diagnosis of smallpox is unlikely to be made “until the fourth or fifth day of the 
rash.”56  Although an outbreak would certainly be attributed to an intentional release, 
there is likely to be little remaining evidence at the scene of the release by the time the 
disease is diagnosed and the attack’s location is discovered because the disease is not 
stable in the environment indefinitely.  Without a human host in which to take refuge, the 
virus would likely only remain viable for one day, and would be undetectable by the time 
cases began to appear one to two weeks later.57 
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2003) http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/files/guide-f.pdf (accessed February 11, 
2012). 
56 Lane and Summer, “Smallpox as a Weapon for Bioterrorism,” 151; Henderson and Borio, 
“Smallpox and Monkeypox,” 628. 
57 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response, 
“Guide F: Environmental Control of Smallpox Virus,” Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines (March 20, 




Smallpox is transmitted from person to person through the air; it is so infective 
that until vaccination was practiced almost no one escaped catching the disease at some 
point in his or her life.58  Although the exact amount of virus one must inhale in order to 
be infected is unknown, it “is believed to be only a few virions.”59  Among unvaccinated 
individuals, the chance of an infected person spreading the disease to a close contact has 
been measured at 40 to 90 percent.60  This variation occurs, in part, due to the differences 
in virulence of each individual strain of the disease and in part by definition of “close” 
contact. 
For example, studies in the 1960s and 1970s determined that smallpox: 
Does not ordinarily spread rapidly.  Transmission requires prolonged face-
to-face contact, such as that which occurs among family members or 
caregivers.  Transmission is most efficient when the index patient is less 
than 6 feet from the recipient, so that the large-droplet respiratory 
secretions can be inhaled.61   
Cases in a German hospital in 1972 proved that face-to-face contact is not always 
required for transmission; in this instance, the virus was determined to have traveled 
through the air to another floor of the hospital.62  This case is generally accepted as a rare 
means of transmission; usually, “[p]atients spread smallpox primarily to household 
members and friends; large outbreaks in schools, for example, were uncommon.”63   
The reason for the most common pattern of transmission—only between “persons 
who have had close, prolonged (not casual or distant) contact with a sick person”64—is 
                                                 
58 Puskoor and Zubay, “Smallpox,” 247; D.A. Henderson et al., “Smallpox as a Biological Weapon: 
Medical and Public Health Management,” JAMA 281, no. 22 (June 9, 1999): 2128. 
59 D.A. Henderson et al., “Smallpox as a Biological Weapon,” 2129. 
60 Puskoor and Zubay, “Smallpox,” 245. 
61 Lane and Summer, “Smallpox as a Weapon for Bioterrorism,” 153. 
62 Ibid., 153. 
63 Henderson et al., “Smallpox as a Biological Weapon,” 2129. 
64 Lane and Goldstein, “Evaluation of 21st-Century Risks of Smallpox Vaccination and Policy 
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partly due to the effects that catching the disease has on the infected person.  Once the 
infected person is contagious (which does not occur until the rash has appeared, usually 
seven to ten days after inhaling the virus65), he or she is often in no condition to carry on 
normal daily activities.  Usually by the time an infected person would be capable of 
transmitting smallpox, he or she would have “been confined to bed because of the high 
fever and malaise of the prodromal illness.”66 
This is often part of the reason that those who do not believe a terrorist could use 
his own infection as a weapon of transmission cite for this method being unlikely.67  
There are others, however, who claim this is not a limiting factor: 
Smallpox could be delivered by aerosolization or by infected “suicide 
carriers.”  Although it seems likely that infected carriers would be too ill 
and the rash too noticeable for terrorists to be able to infect a large number 
of people without detection, the disease is mild enough in its early stages 
that the rash could be disguised and an infected carrier could be given 
drugs to moderate symptoms.  A few infected individuals in densely 
packed cities distant from one another could infect enough people to cause 
major epidemics.  The geographical separation would add to the straining 
of public health resources within the target nation.68 
Other medical professionals have taken a middle ground, believing that patients with less 
severe cases could, theoretically, be mobile enough to spread their disease; however, 
these milder cases have generally been found to be “not efficient transmitters.”69   
The balance of information seems to support that while it would be possible for a 
terrorist to infect himself and attempt to spread smallpox to his contacts, it is likely that 
he would be unsuccessful due to his own symptoms either revealing his illness or 
preventing him from socializing, or because his milder case of smallpox would not be 
highly transmissible. 
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B. VACCINATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THREAT PERCEPTION 
Although there was a time when smallpox vaccination was recommended for all 
American children at age one, the disease’s eradication gave occasion to cease this 
practice.70  When it was believed that the threat of contracting the disease was minimal, 
the risks of the vaccination were no longer seen as necessary.  The last vaccinations given 
in the U.S. were performed in 1972, but immunity provided by vaccination—unlike that 
which is gained by contracting the disease—is not life-long.   
Although it is not known exactly the degree of immunity that remains after forty 
or more years have passed since vaccination, it is believed that most of the people who 
were previously vaccinated are no longer immune.71  Having been previously vaccinated 
decades ago would likely cause a greater chance of surviving a smallpox infection, but 
would likely not prevent contraction of the disease.72  Vaccination is generally thought to 
provide protection for three to ten years, although the duration seems to vary between 
individuals.73  Repeated vaccination, or booster shots, increases protection.74  These facts 
have contributed to a “highly susceptible, largely unvaccinated global population”75 in 
which, today, “vaccination immunity in the population has waned … substantially.”76  
This condition makes the United States vulnerable, but does not necessarily have any 
bearing on whether there is a threat. 
Some countries have assessed that this vulnerability is unacceptable in their 
military forces or medical professionals.  The United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Israel continue to vaccinate those who “might be at higher risk of coming in contact with 
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a smallpox patient by virtue of their professions if the virus were used as a bioterrorism 
agent.”77  After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the CDC: 
Vaccinated about 140 members of special teams of disease detectives who 
are ready to be sent at a moment’s notice to investigate a suspected 
[smallpox] outbreak anywhere in the country.  In addition, the CDC has 
been training local and state health officials to prepare them to respond to 
a potential smallpox outbreak.78 
When compared to the risks of contracting and (potentially not) surviving 
smallpox, the risks from the vaccine are seemingly minimal.  But when there is no risk of 
contraction, there is no need to experience the risks of vaccination.  Although the side 
effects from vaccination can be severe, the chances are greater of surviving the vaccine 
than of surviving full-blown smallpox.  Risks from the vaccine include adverse skin 
reactions such as eczema vaccinatum (comprising inflammation, eruptions, and a high 
temperature), progressive vaccinia (lesions that do not heal and sometimes spread), or 
general vaccinia (usually characterized by high fever and malaise along with multiple 
lesions similar to the vaccination pustule).79   
Although eczema vaccinatum has a fatality rate of only 1 percent, today’s 
population would be three times more likely to experience this adverse reaction (as 
compared to studies in the 1960s) due to greater numbers of people in today’s population 
who have eczema.80  In persons with immune deficiency disorders, progressive vaccinia 
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cases would be likely to occur if vaccination were reintroduced due to the increased 
prevalence in modern times of immune systems issues such as HIV, chemotherapy, and 
organ transplants.82    
More serious complications can include postvaccinal nervous system diseases 
such as postvaccinal encephalopathy, encephalitis, or encephalomyelitis,83 which can 
cause any combination of the following: fever, vomiting, headache, malaise, 
disorientation, convulsions, coma, paralysis, mental impairment, death, or a full recovery 
after two weeks.84  Based upon data collected by the CDC in 1968, postvaccinial 
encephalitis occurred in one of every 300,000 vaccinations and one-quarter of these 
resulted in death.85  Other vaccinees have suffered from heart problems such as 
myopericarditis, angina, and myocardial infractions.86  Myocarditis has been shown in 
one in every 18,000 people who were vaccinated; its fatality rate is unknown.87 
Based upon past statistics of adverse responses to smallpox vaccinations, it has 
been predicted that if 300 million people were vaccinated, “at least 1,500 people would 
develop a serious side effect from the vaccine and at least 300 people would likely die.”88 
Others have calculated that “if 1 million persons were vaccinated, as many as 250 
persons would experience adverse reactions of a type that would require administration of 
VIG.”89  Vaccinia immune globulin (VIG) is given to smallpox vaccine recipients who 
suffer adverse reactions to the vaccine.90  Extrapolations of earlier vaccination data to 
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Americans in 2003 shows that “we should expect a minimum of 125 deaths”91 and that 
“death rates could be much higher than in 1968.”92   
In spite of these risks, U.S. government officials considered re-commencing 
vaccination.  Smallpox expert D.A. Henderson was repeatedly called to the White House 
in 2001 and 2002 to meet with Vice President Richard Cheney about the threat of 
smallpox.93  Henderson advised against recommencing mass vaccination because the risk 
of vaccine posed a high cost that was, in his opinion, not outweighed by what he 
perceived as a small chance of smallpox being used as a bioterror weapon.  Furthermore, 
Henderson believed that, provided with sufficient quantities of vaccine, the means that 
were perfected during the eradication program could be used again to control any 
smallpox outbreak that did occur.94  As history supports, smallpox spreads slowly enough 
under natural conditions that “a reasonable mix of judicious vaccination of close contacts 
and effective isolation of patients can readily stop an outbreak within two infective 
generations (about 4 weeks) after recognition of initial cases.”95  In spite of this, 
Henderson felt that his advice fell on deaf ears and that “Vice President Cheney and his 
aides… saw smallpox as being highly likely, an almost certain catastrophic event”96 that 
could not be ignored.  The actual level of risk, however, is much lower. 
1. National Smallpox Vaccination Campaign 
In December 2002, President George W. Bush announced the government’s plan 
to begin a new smallpox vaccination campaign.97  Civilians were asked to submit to the 
high-risk vaccine, even though the president acknowledged that there was no indication 
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of an impending attack.98  At the time of his announcement, there was a significant 
debate surrounding the risks and benefits of smallpox vaccination.  Experts in the fields 
of intelligence and security studies could not agree on whether there was or was not a 
credible threat of smallpox attack, and the medical community was at odds over whether 
the vaccine posed too many risks to be given in light of the questionable chance of 
becoming infected.  The debate surrounding the president’s new plan, the threat of attack, 
and the threat from the vaccine were covered extensively in the media and contributed to 
the perception that there was a significant threat.99 
If the threat of a smallpox attack is indeed exaggerated, why did President Bush 
launch the National Smallpox Vaccination Campaign?  Does the fact that it was allowed 
to stall out after completing only the military (not the civilian) portion of the campaign 
give any indication of the level of threat on the part of the government?100  The 
presidential attention to this issue and the surrounding media coverage inflated the 
perception that the threat from smallpox attack was credible, without providing additional 
information on the actual plausibility or likelihood of an attack.101 
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2. Public Opinion and Vaccination 
Smallpox as a bioweapon continues to be a concern of many.  A poll conducted in 
1999 indicated that a majority of Americans believed the United States would be attacked 
biologically or chemically within the next fifty years.102  Two years later, Americans 
were presented with two highly visible examples that terrorism was a threat: the World 
Trade Center attacks and the following week’s anthrax mailings.  In the months following 
these terrorist attacks, a significant number of volunteers contacted medical facilities and 
research centers across the country requesting to participate in trials of smallpox 
vaccines, in some cases even before the requests for volunteers had been published.103  
However, as time passed, the public’s general feelings toward the need for preparation 
changed.   
In a May 2002 telephone poll, fifty-nine percent of those surveyed reported that 
they would be vaccinated as a precautionary measure against a terrorist smallpox 
attack.104  By 2003, the public opinion polls indicated that Americans were losing 
confidence in the government’s ability to protect them against terrorist attacks.105  It 
would seem, then, that the National Smallpox Vaccination Program would be hailed as a 
welcome addition to the bioterrorism-protection arsenal and that there would be a 
positive response to the availability of previously unavailable protective measures, but 
this was not the case.   
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Some believed that this vaccine, hailed as a necessary protective measure, was not 
necessary at all.106  One commonly cited claim is that the nature of the virus itself makes 
it unsuitable for use as a biological weapon.  Just to handle the virus, sophisticated 
laboratory equipment, top security facilities, and highly specific knowledge of 
microbiology and virology are required.  To turn it into a weapon requires even greater 
skill and funding than terrorists are likely to possess.107  Given the small probability of 
terrorists being able to accomplish an attack with smallpox, many claim that there is little 
reason to be vaccinated.  Yet these claims are made without sufficient studies conducted 
to determine whether this threat perception is valid. 
Others believe that there may be a threat, but that the United States is adequately 
prepared to respond to it.  They maintain that the public health infrastructure and 
emergency response preparedness plans, combined with the efficacy of vaccination after 
an attack, are sufficient to protect the population.108  The fact that the smallpox vaccine 
can be effectively given up to three or four days after exposure, they claim, makes it most 
reasonable to wait to receive the vaccine until there is proof of a threat.109  To these 
people, the question of threat is less of a concern, but more accurate information 
surrounding the likelihood of an attack would be beneficial to informing their 
preparedness measures.   
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Opponents to this view claim that America is dangerously ill-prepared to face a 
bioterrorist attack.110  They believe the risks of the vaccine are acceptable when weighed 
against the risks of an unprotected population.  In light of the possibility that terrorist 
actors possess smallpox virus and America’s low immunity to it, they believe it is only a 
matter of time before an attacker takes advantage of this critical vulnerability; therefore, a 
sensible step toward protection is pre-attack vaccination.  A better understanding of the 
actual threat would inform this debate and would help guide the needed protections. 
This debate among novices and experts alike was played out in the media at the 
time of the vaccination campaign, and continues to reappear periodically.111  These 
debates have become the basis for most of the current opinions that an attack is possible.  
In response to the widespread vaccination debate, the Johns Hopkins School of Public 
Health undertook a study in 2004 that addressed the question of who should be 
vaccinated and when this should occur, concluding that proposed vaccination models 
were insufficient and proposing a new hybrid vaccination strategy.112 
The persistence of the debate over re-commencing vaccination in the United 
States has muddled the issues of threat plausibility and preparedness.  It is partly 
responsible for assumptions that there is a credible threat of smallpox attack but does not 
examine the factors that influence whether this is actually the case. 
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C. MISPERCEPTIONS AND EXAGGERATIONS IN GOVERNMENT 
PREPAREDNESS EXERCISES 
1. Dark Winter 
According to D.A. Henderson, one of the leaders of the Johns Hopkins Center for 
Civilian Biodefense Studies, the organization sought to convey to government officials 
the catastrophic potential that an attack using biological weapons would have.  The 
organization believed that: 
Until members of the US Congress and others at the highest levels of 
government fully understood the potential for disaster and the need to be 
prepared, they would not commit the necessary resources.  We decided 
that the best way to illustrate this would be to dramatize it.113   
For this reason, in June 2001, an exercise called Dark Winter was developed in 
coordination with the Center for Strategic International Studies, the Homeland Security 
Institute, and the Oklahoma Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.114   
Because “few could imagine the repercussions from a major epidemic of a deadly 
infectious disease,”115 the authors of the exercise sought to educate about the need for the 
government to address the issue of potential biological warfare.  They chose to use 
smallpox in the exercise as a means to demonstrate this.  Senators, governors, and other 
government officials assembled at Andrews Air Force Base to conduct the scenario, in 
which “the hypothetical epidemic spread to twenty-five states and ten other countries, 
with 16,000 cases and 1,000 deaths.”116  It immediately became clear that an attack using 
biological weapons was a serious issue, and smallpox’s starring role in the exercise 
caused immediate concern over whether such an epidemic was possible.117   
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In the scenario, the specific terrorist organization responsible was unknown, but 
the FBI assessed that only a state or state-sponsored terrorist actor was likely to have the 
resources to have conducted this type of attack.118  Although it was unconfirmed, the 
exercise explained the most likely state involved in starting the fictional outbreaks was 
Iraq and that former-Soviet bioweaponeers were involved.119 
The exercise did much to cause general concern over whether government was 
prepared to deal with a major public health crisis, and raised public awareness of the 
potential for a bioterror attack involving smallpox.120  Some scientists involved in the 
smallpox eradication program, however, have claimed that the exercise caused undue 
alarm because it incorrectly portrayed characteristics of the disease, which heightened the 
catastrophic results.121  The dispute centers around the manner in which mathematical 
models simulate the spread of the disease; the modelers design the scenario based upon a 
certain transmission speed of the virus and, in the case of smallpox, experts cannot agree 
on this number.122   
Those who claim that Dark Winter was unrealistically inflammatory and predicted 
casualties in excess of numbers that are likely have called the exercise’s portrayal of 
smallpox silly, and Martin Meltzer of the CDC has described the scenario’s premise (that 
a terrorist could spread a smallpox epidemic by first infecting himself and then 
interacting with people in a public place) as “absolutely preposterous.”123  If these 
experts are to be believed, this and similar portrayals of smallpox have raised the alarm 
unnecessarily high and have contributed to excessive fear surrounding the potential for 
smallpox to be used as a bioweapon. 
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2. Atlantic Storm 
Another government exercise in which terrorism-by-smallpox played a lead role 
was organized in Washington in 2005.  It was based upon the premise that such an 
epidemic would be a concern for the international community, and focused on 
implications of initial smallpox cases in Istanbul, Frankfurt, Rotterdam, Warsaw, Los 
Angeles, and New York resulting from a terrorist attack.124   
In the scenario, a “radical al Qaeda splinter group that is small, well-funded, 
fanatical, and well-educated”125 is led by a man with a Ph.D. in microbiology who has 
been assessed as being “fully capable of weaponizing and mass producing the variola 
virus.”126  The group controls a small laboratory and has been in contact with scientists 
who formerly worked in the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program.127 
Arms-control expert Milton Leitenberg takes issue with this exercise on two 
counts: first, a lack of evidence that any terrorist group can even manufacture a working  
biological weapon, and second, that the scenario’s description of how this might occur is 
implausible.128  In the scenario, terrorists sprayed smallpox out of back-pack sized 
aerosol sprayers in public places.129 
The authors of the exercise point out on its website the disclaimer that: 
While the exercise scenario was based on the events that might follow a 
bioterrorist attack with smallpox, Atlantic Storm was not about smallpox 
per se. Rather, the exercise was designed to highlight the numerous 
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complicated global challenges that would arise in the event of any large-
scale epidemic of infectious disease, whether caused by a bioterrorist 
attack or a naturally occurring outbreak.130   
Although raising smallpox attack awareness was not a stated goal of the exercise, major 
world leaders gathering in Washington to discuss the issue did not escape the notice of 
the media.131  In addition, the exercise was observed by more than 100 international 
professionals in the fields of national security, public health, medicine, and 
government.132  With this level of attention, the issue of smallpox itself was bound to be 
noticed, and it is probable that the average media consumer drew conclusions that a 
bioterror attack using smallpox was both possible and perhaps even probable. 
This is a second example in which the realities of smallpox transmission and 
weaponization may have been exaggerated in order to demonstrate the effect of a 
biological attack on an unprepared population.  Although the authors of the study 
intentionally modeled the scenario using “a conservative disease transmission rate of 1 to 
3”133 for the initial cases, their assumptions of terrorist capabilities were very generous.  
Government officials were said to have left with the perception that “[e]normous changes 
will be needed if the world community is to be prepared to cope with what many feel are 
inevitable crises engendered by biological weapons attacks.”134  It is likely that, in 
addition, they left with an artificial sense of the actual threat that posed by terrorists using 
smallpox.   
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D. CONCLUSION 
In the following chapters, I will address this issue of actual risk of a smallpox 
bioterror attack.  Examining whether smallpox is realistic for terrorists to use will show 
that acquisition, production, weaponization, and dissemination of smallpox are 
challenging and complex procedures.  Addressing whether there are terrorists who are 
likely to prefer smallpox over other weapons will demonstrate that smallpox does not 
meet many of the criteria that terrorists are likely to value when choosing their means and 
methods of attack.  Reviewing the claims of state and non-state actors regarding 
biological weapons and outside assessments of their likelihood of possessing smallpox 
demonstrates that possession of the virus is often uncertain, or is not distinguished 
separately from other capabilities using other biological agents.  Examining whether the 
current policies, laws, and treaties are likely to act as a deterrent to choosing smallpox as 
a bioweapon will show that domestic and international legal regimes as they relate to 
bioterror are insufficient.  These factors inform the assessment of actual threat from 
smallpox attack and will show that the risk is less than many would suppose. 
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II. IS SMALLPOX REALISTIC FOR TERRORISTS TO USE? 
According to the Congressional Research Service, “most experts feel that the 
barriers posed by acquisition and successful deployment of smallpox virus are high 
enough to make such an attack very unlikely.  Furthermore, because of these hurdles, 
most experts feel that a terrorist organization would require a state sponsor in order to 
successfully obtain and deploy smallpox.”135  Evidence from the Soviet Union supports 
this conclusion by demonstrating that clandestine weaponization is possible with the 
benefit of the significant resources that were devoted to its state bioweapons project.136  
The question remains whether terrorist actors today who are not provided with state 
sponsorship would be able to similarly overcome the barriers to smallpox weaponization. 
This chapter addresses the technical details and laboratory requirements 
associated with smallpox weaponization and dispersal and the possibility that terrorists 
might be capable of synthetically engineering the virus versus acquiring stored stocks. 
A. ACQUIRING SMALLPOX 
Obtaining smallpox is not likely to be easy.  The WHO-authorized laboratories in 
Atlanta, Georgia, and Koltsovo, Russia, are the only places on earth where smallpox is 
known to be stored.  These are maximum containment laboratories, guarded against 
unauthorized entry.137  Physical security measures, identity badges, and two-person 
access rules all contribute to the difficulty a terrorist would have in acquiring smallpox 
from either of the known repositories.138   
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Some scientists have claimed, however, that those two laboratories are not likely 
to be the only places still holding stocks of smallpox.139  Scientists Alan Zelicoff and 
Michael Bellomo explain their assessment that the presence of smallpox is more 
widespread: 
If not by intent, then smallpox is likely to be in several countries by 
accident, kept in freezers in hundreds of places around the world.  During 
the WHO global smallpox eradication program, medical professionals 
from many different countries both vaccinated and treated thousands of 
people for smallpox.  And it is a fact that biologists and physicians tend to 
keep samples of everything, out of habit if nothing else. When these folks 
die, they don’t exactly leave a will and testament that says, ‘Please destroy 
my smallpox samples.’  A medical center may go for years before getting 
around to cleaning out samples collected by long-dead physicians and 
tucked away in a basement freezer.  Therefore, it’s quite probable that 
there are collections, compiled intentionally or otherwise, of smallpox in 
places outside of the two official repositories in the United States and 
Russia.140 
Even if smallpox is stored in a long-forgotten freezer, terrorists are unlikely to be aware 
of its existence and location.  The problem of acquisition of the smallpox virus would 
necessarily prevent many terrorists from doing more than considering its use. 
B. SYNTHETIC ENGINEERING OF THE SMALLPOX VIRUS 
1. Is it Possible? 
Based upon the scientific research that has been carried out and publicized since 
its eradication, it is plausible that the smallpox virus can be genetically engineered.  In 
order to genetically engineer a virus, one first has to determine the make-up of its DNA 
(called sequencing the genome), and then to assemble the pieces, called nucleotides, in 
the correct order.  In 1994, the first step of this process was completed for one particular 
strain of smallpox.141  By 2001, the sequencing of the genome of several strains of 
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Variola major had been completed.142  Although using this information to recreate the 
virus by synthesizing its DNA would be “time consuming and highly technical,”143 it is 
nonetheless simple to find, through a simple Internet search, where complete nucleotide 
sequences of Variola major have been made available for download.144 
Richard Preston, a journalist and best-selling author, researched smallpox for his 
book The Demon in the Freezer and came to the conclusion that these issues are not just 
science-fiction.  Regarding synthetic engineering of the virus, he summarizes:  
The DNA of smallpox has been decoded.  The genetic sequence of the 
virus is known; the smallpox genome is in the public domain.  You can 
look it up on the Internet.  Even if all the stocks were destroyed, we—the 
human species—would still possess the recipe for making it.  It might be 
possible some day to re-create smallpox in a laboratory, although this 
would not be easy.  It would require, at the very least, fast gene-synthesis 
machines—machines that could string together thousands of letters of 
DNA into genes rapidly and accurately.145 
D.A. Henderson agrees that, “the virus itself eventually might be synthesized.”146  
Jonathan Tucker concurs that as “DNA synthesis technology continues to progress at a 
rapid pace, it will soon become possible for cutting-edge scientists to re-create any virus 
whose genetic sequence has been determined, including the smallpox virus.”147  It is 
clear that scientific advances are changing the nature of the threat. 
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Because the process of synthesizing smallpox virus DNA is thought to be 
technologically feasible,148 the problem of initially acquiring the smallpox virus could be 
significantly altered from the terrorist point of view: instead of relying on finding or 
stealing historically stored samples, they might have the option to create the smallpox 
virus synthetically.   
2. Is it Realistic to Think that Terrorists are Capable of This? 
One scientist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Biomedical 
Engineering department has studied the challenges terrorists would likely face when 
attempting to synthesize smallpox.  He has assessed that, while the project is 
scientifically feasible, staffing might be problematic: 
The procedures involved in viral synthesis require a professional 
knowledge of biology and a confirmed proficiency in biotechnology.  
Competent assistants could do much day-to-day work, but something like 
a smallpox-from-scratch project would require considerable innovation, 
not just at its inception but repeatedly, long-term.  Recruiting and retaining 
a capable director and a clever, committed, and behaviorally stable staff is 
hard enough in normal science; it must be even harder in apocalyptic 
terrorism.149   
Legitimate scientific research, unrelated to smallpox, has left other scientists 
wondering how close modern science is to engineering the smallpox virus.  Two studies 
show that scientific advances can have impact on making bioweapons and on engineering 
smallpox, even when that was not the intent of the research.  In the first study, scientists 
at the Cooperative Research Center for Biological Control of Pest Animals in Australia 
inadvertently altered the mousepox virus, which is very similar to smallpox, in such a 
way that the virulence and lethality of mousepox in mice was significantly raised because 
of the way the immune system was suppressed.150  If the same gene were to be added to 
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the smallpox virus, it is assumed that a similar strengthening of the virus’ ability to defeat 
current vaccines could occur, causing an exceptionally lethal version of the smallpox 
virus.151   
The second study, involving polio, proved that scientists could use information 
about the disease’s DNA from the Internet to map out how to piece together strands of 
DNA that are available to be purchased from legitimate scientific institutions.  Scientists 
have noted the implication this has for nefarious scientists interested in genome 
sequencing, stating “the concern here is that similar techniques might be used to produce 
other dangerous pathogens such as smallpox.”152  Although such a concern is valid, it is 
important to note that Variola is a much larger and more complex virus than the 
poliomyelitis virus.153  Because the Variola virus is twenty-six times larger, assembling 
the virus would be “an exceedingly slow process” that would likely takes months or years 
to complete.154 
In spite of these seeming scientific advances, some reputable scientists remain 
unconvinced.  A professor of immunology at University of California at Los Angeles 
believes that these claims are exaggerated: “It is almost inconceivable that any terrorist 
organization we know of [could develop] a bioweapon capable of causing mass casualties 
on American soil.”155   
There is no reason to assume that well-equipped terrorists are inherently less 
capable than well-equipped scientists.  Once it is scientifically possible, anyone with the 
right knowledge and equipment would be capable of synthesizing the Variola virus.  One 
scientist has assessed the cost of additional equipment (beyond standard laboratory 
supplies) that would be required in order to synthesize a virus.  He calculated that buying 
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the required nucleotide sequences for Variola through the mail would cost $50,000.156  
The equipment required to assemble the pieces (a DNA synthesizer, a DNA sequencer, a 
thermocycler, centrifuges, hoods, and sterilization equipment) would cost an additional 
four- to five-hundred thousand dollars.157  This amount of money would not be 
prohibitive to all terrorist organizations; for example, Aum Shinrikyo managed to raise 
between $300 million and $1.4 billion in assets for its terrorism projects.158  
The case of Aum Shinrikyo also demonstrates that funding is not the sole hurdle 
that must be overcome in chemical or biological attack.  As with smallpox, there are 
other barriers to weaponization that must be addressed by scientists with biotechnical 
backgrounds.  Following the proper procedures and precautions to grow smallpox safely 
and correctly while remaining undetected is one challenge that the terrorists would likely 
find difficult to resolve.  They must also choose a means of weaponization, and either 
resort to using infected suicide volunteers, or perfect the required procedures to 
disseminate smallpox in a liquid or dry form.  All three dissemination methods present 
barriers to success due to either the low chance of transmission, large amount of 
technological accessories required, or danger to weaponizers during the process.   
Although the Soviet Union was able to overcome these difficulties, its 
weaponization program was funded by the state, provided with multiple well-equipped 
laboratories designed for bioweapons research, supplemented with a high-tech missile 
inventory to aid in dissemination, and staffed with credibly trained scientists.  It is 
probable that these benefits would not be available to individual bioterrorists; this makes 
it less likely that one could successfully weaponize smallpox.  Additionally, the Soviet  
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government devoted resources to protecting the secrecy of its program.  A non-state 
program trying to hide its activities would be more susceptible to discovery, which could 
act as an additional deterrent. 
C. WEAPONIZING SMALLPOX 
There are several factors that would influence whether or not terrorists would 
choose to weaponize smallpox as a bioterror weapon above their other options.  The 
prediction that a “clandestine aerosol release of smallpox, even if it infected only 50 to 
100 persons to produce the first generation of cases, would rapidly spread in a now highly 
susceptible population, expanding by a factor of 10 to 20 times or more with each 
generation of cases”159 might seem to heighten the appeal of smallpox as a way of 
meeting terrorist goals.  There are, however, challenges that a terrorist must overcome in 
order to make this feasible.  Studies of the Soviet biological weaponization program have 
shown that: 
Key steps involved in obtaining a potent BW capability causing large-
scale deaths include: (1) acquiring virulent strains; (2) growing biological 
agents; (3) formulating the biological agents for weaponization; (4) 
developing a means of delivery; and (5) effectively disseminating the 
agent. Achieving all of these steps is difficult. A study of state-sponsored 
offensive programs indicates that production of potent and effective 
biological weapons has involved a significant investment of expertise, 
infrastructure, and resources.160 
Difficulties that might prevent terrorists from successful weaponization include 
the facts that the virus is likely to be difficult to obtain, that smallpox is challenging to 
work with safely during the weaponization process, and that dispersal of the virus does 
not necessarily guarantee infection.161  On the other hand, an attack using smallpox is 
likely to go undiscovered for days until people begin showing symptoms: this would give 
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the terrorist time to conduct multiple attacks or to escape the affected area.162  These 
criteria may or may not make smallpox an appealing weapon, depending on terrorist 
goals and intent.  Regardless of its appeal, however, an actor who decides to pursue the 
use of smallpox as a weapon must first ensure that a sufficient quantity of the virus is in a 
state that is stable and capable of being spread. 
1. Laboratory and Scientific Requirements 
In order to work with Variola, a potential bioterrorist would need an equipped 
laboratory, adequate biohazard containment and decontamination measures, and a means 
to protect himself from infection (preferably vaccination).  He would also need to ensure 
that suspicious biohazard waste or unusually thorough decontamination precautions did 
not cause inquiry into his laboratory activities.163   
A potential bioterrorist would either have to conduct smallpox weaponization 
procedures secretly in an equipped laboratory to which he already possessed access, or 
would have to build and equip a new laboratory specifically for this purpose.  It is not 
outside the realm of possibility to set up one’s own laboratory environment.  By taking 
advantage of the dual-use nature of scientific equipment, Soviet scientists were able to 
build a functioning microbiology lab “from scratch”164 that was first used to weaponize 
Brucella bacteria.165 They did this near Moscow in four months in the 1970s with 
laboratory equipment bought from Japan, Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, and the 
United States.166   
The equipment required to build a scientific laboratory to be used for bioweapons 
is commercially available; however, the Soviet project was conducted many years ago.  
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In order to determine whether a similar project could succeed in today’s environment of 
heightened awareness, in 1998 and 1999 the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 
set out to build a “factory capable of making germ weapons with commercially available 
materials.”167 The goal was to determine whether this could be done without signaling to 
intelligence agencies that equipment that could be used for biological warfare was being 
purchased in the U.S. and overseas.168  With a $1.6 million budget and several months, 
the team was able to outfit a laboratory that produced simulated anthrax (harmless 
bacteria and biopesticides); their purchases went undetected.169 
After laboratory equipment is acquired, safety concerns must be addressed.  Both 
of the WHO-authorized laboratory facilities that store smallpox virus are rated at 
Biosafety Level Four (BSL-4), which is considered a maximum containment facility.  
According to the CDC, BSL-4 laboratories are used for “agents that pose a high risk of 
life-threatening disease, which may be transmitted by the aerosol route and for which 
there is no vaccine or therapy.”170  Some of the safety measures present in BSL-4 
laboratories that prudent bioterrorists would be concerned with replicating in their own 
smallpox laboratory include: a negative-pressure controlled air system with high-
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration, Class III biological safety cabinets171 or 
protective suits with self-contained breathing apparatus, an autoclave for 
decontamination, and an emergency power supply.172  Guidelines for constructing a 
BSL-4 laboratory are available on the Internet; although these are designed with the 
                                                 
167 Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s 
Secret War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 297. 
168 Ibid., 296–299. 
169 Ibid., 297–298. 
170 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Special Pathogens Branch, “Glossary of Terms,” 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/spb/mnpages/glossary.htm (accessed February 11, 2012). 
171 Class III Microbiological Safety Cabinet: “A safety cabinet by which the operator is separated 
from the work by a barrier, e.g., by gloves mechanically attached to the cabinet, and from which escape of 
any airborne particulate contamination is prevented by an exhaust filtration system.” Definition from: 
Bioaerosols Handbook, ed. Christopher Cox and Christopher Wathes (New York, NY: Lewis Publishers, 
1995), 476. 
172 World Health Organization, Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd ed., (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 2004) http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/Biosafety7.pdf (accessed 
February 11, 2012), 25–27, 56–57. 
 38
safety and eventual certification of legitimate research facilities in mind, there is nothing 
preventing a bioterrorist from using this information to design a laboratory that is safe for 
handling smallpox virus.   
Assuming one has the proper equipment and safety measures in place, the next 
step toward weaponization is to turn a small sample of virus into an amount great enough 
to be used as an effective weapon.  In nontechnical media reporting, the weaponization 
process is sometimes erroneously generalized as though all biological agents are grown in 
the same way;173 in these cases, the process that is usually described is that for bacteria.  
The weaponization process for bacteria requires less scientific know-how and can be 
completed in fermenters of the kind that would be found in a brewery.174  Viruses, on the 
other hand, are more complicated to work with and “need to be grown in eggs or 
commercially available bio-reactors rather than the relatively more easy fermenting 
process needed for bacteria.”175  Referring to techniques used for weaponizing bacteria 
when discussing viruses further confuses the issue of accurate threat assessment. 
In order to grow viruses in a laboratory, tissue cultures are needed.  As compared 
to the easier task of growing bacteria, “handling the virus necessitates a more specialized 
knowledge of laboratory procedures, and the developer puts himself at risk if extreme 
safety precautions are not taken.  Hence, Ebola and other viruses that cause lethal 
hemorrhagic diseases are agents less likely to be used by terrorists.”176  The fact that 
growing and handling viruses is more difficult may not be sufficient to deter all actors.   
In the case of smallpox, the “virus grows well on many tissue cultures and on the 
chorioallantoic membrane of embryonated chicken eggs.”177  Although this sounds quite 
technical, it was accomplished in the Soviet Union with 1940s technology: at Zagorsk in 
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1947 smallpox was grown in chicken egg embryos and relatively low-tech equipment.178  
All that was required (aside from the virus itself and knowledge of the procedure) was a 
small syringe, wax to seal the hole that would be made in the egg shell, a thermostatic 
oven or incubator to warm the egg while the virus multiplied, vats, stabilizing materials, 
and a refrigerator.179  After three or four days of incubation, the virus could be harvested 
from the egg membrane, “yielding a liquid suspension so enriched in variola virus that it 
usually did not require further concentration.”180 
Once a sufficient amount of the virus is on hand, the next step is to prepare it for 
weaponization.  Although many suppose that the details of weaponization are freely 
available, some have pointed out that: 
Far from the popular concept that “anyone” can develop BW agents in 
their bathtub, the art of developing BW agents and the munitions to 
deliver them is a carefully guarded secret.  Even decades after the U.S. 
offensive BW program ended, little is published about how these weapons 
were developed or employed out of fear that other nations might pick up 
some tips.181   
Former Soviet scientists, too, have demonstrated reluctance to discuss the intricate details 
of weaponization in interviews or publically available materials.182 
2. Characteristics of the Virus that Make It Suitable for Weaponization 
The smallpox virus is not simply cited as a potential weapon of bioterror because 
of its history as a terrible disease.  There are characteristics of the virus that make it more 
suitable than other viruses to be successfully weaponized and dispersed.  When one is 
choosing a biological weapon, considerations of whether the agent can survive 
dissemination are paramount.  Sunlight, heat, and weather conditions are some of the 
environmental factors that the agent must be able to withstand.  Additionally, the 
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infectivity of the agent chosen must match the means of dispersal; in the case of 
smallpox, because the virus is transmitted through inhalation, aerosol delivery is most 
suitable.  In general, it has been assessed that “aerosol release of Variola virus would 
disseminate widely, given the considerable stability of the orthopoxviruses in aerosol 
form and the likelihood that the infectious dose is very small.”183  From a terrorist point 
of view, these are precisely the characteristics that would make an agent favorable. 
Studies from 1961, 1974, and 1988 determined that “Variola virus is fairly hardy 
in the environment if protected from heat and ultraviolet light.”184  If too much heat 
could render the virus inert, it would not make a successful bioweapon; however, there 
are laboratory procedures that can be conducted, called lyophilization, that improve 
tolerance to heat.  Scientists expect that these drying techniques could be used with 
smallpox based upon their knowledge of vaccinia: “Vaccinia virus, a close cousin of 
variola, is routinely grown in many laboratories, and can be lyophilized to ensure stability 
to heat.  The same techniques could be used with variola.”185   
An additional factor to consider when debating whether smallpox could be 
weaponized, dispersed, and survive is that it is possible to alter the virus in specific ways 
to make its survival more likely.  Because “the genes of orthopoxviruses are amenable to 
deletions and additions,”186 it is possible that different strains could be created with 
characteristics that are more suitable to surviving these processes.  It is likely, though, 
that only highly-trained scientists would be capable of this type of technical laboratory 
work. 
3. Technological Difficulties and Barriers to Dissemination 
Spreading smallpox in such a way that it will remain able to infect those who 
come into contact with the virus is another hurdle that potential bioweaponeers would 
have to address.  First, the care that was taken in the preceding steps of preparing the 
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smallpox (such as care taken with “the medium chosen for cultivation, length of 
incubation … temperature, harvesting conditions, and storage”187) must have been 
adequate.  Shoddy preparation can lead to dead or degraded virus.188  Second, the virus 
must survive dissemination; this can be problematic because “the airborne environment is 
hostile [to bioaerosols] owing to desiccation, exposure to radiation, oxygen, and 
pollutants.”189  Third, smallpox is not a natural aerosol; that is:  
It does not travel in the air in nature.  The smallpox particle can be found 
in the skin, in the scabs that fall off a victim, and in most bodily 
secretions.  Patients experience some coughing with smallpox, and a sort 
of spitting and the clearing of the throat.  But when the smallpox falls off 
the skin or dribbles out of the mouth, there is insufficient energy to create 
an aerosol.  Making an aerosol requires a large amount of energy.190 
When smallpox is contained in scabs, the particles are too big heavy to float 
through the air.191  They usually “fall to the ground within a few meters of [the] object 
they are released from—the mucous lining of the throat in an individual with smallpox 
who is coughing, for example.”192  For this reason, in order for smallpox to be 
disseminated (other than by human to human transmission), it must be either suspended 
in liquid or dried into a powder.  Assuming this has been done, the bioterrorist must then 
address the means of aerosol dissemination.   
Although scenarios often portray this process as a simple spraying of agent from 
something similar to an agricultural sprayer and resulting in automatic successful 
infection,193 others have cautioned that “[a]erosol delivery means is not the ‘sure thing’ it 
initially seems.  Because these weapons are aerosol plumes, their use is constrained—to a 
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degree often not appreciated by initial analysis—by numerous local topographical and 
meteorological conditions.”194  In an outdoor release, excessive sun, heat, wind, 
humidity, or rain could decrease the chances for widespread infection by killing the virus 
or simply causing the particles to fall out of the air.195  It has been hypothesized that 
smallpox virus would survive for less than twenty-four hours if it were delivered through 
the air. 196  These meteorological constraints would not be difficult to attempt to mitigate, 
assuming a terrorist was knowledgeable of these factors and that he had an unconstrained 
timeline for smallpox dispersal that would allow him to wait for ideal environmental 
conditions. 
In spite of these constraints, the characteristics of the virus (such as ideal particle 
size for airborne particle suspension) are known, and information surrounding 
dissemination techniques is available.  While it is true that the scale and technological 
development of the Soviet program might be difficult to replicate, such a large-scale 
program might not be required for a terrorist actor seeking to perpetuate one or several 
small attacks.  It is likely that the general techniques involved in small-scale aerosol 
delivery are sufficiently available to warrant consideration that knowledgeable terrorists 
could apply this information to smallpox and attempt this method.  For example, it is no 
secret that scientists have concluded that:  
The key to weaponizing a BW agent is getting the BW agent to cluster in 
particles of the right size: particles of one to five microns.  Less than one 
micron and the agent does not stay in a person’s lungs.  More than five 
microns and it drops to the ground and threatens no one.197   
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Others have observed that any particle size between two and eight microns can 
behave as an aerosol.198   
 Smallpox does not naturally lend itself to aerosolization because the virus 
particles tend to be too heavy to travel far beyond the infected; however there are two 
cases in which smallpox aerosolization is the suspected mode of transmission.199  
Smallpox was transmitted via airborne virus that travelled “a considerable distance” in 
both a German hospital in 1970 and off the coast of Vozrozhdeniye Island in 1971.200  
These cases, though controversial at the time, “proved that it could be aerosolized.”201  A 
knowledgeable scientist trained in microbiology would be familiar with the techniques 
used to disperse particles and to measure their size, thereby being able to assess whether 
such particles would travel through the air.  This knowledge could, in theory, be applied 
to smallpox. 
A terrorist hoping to use some type of aerosol delivery method would most likely 
need to test this equipment.  This has the potential to cause suspicion or capture, which 
might make a terrorist less likely to prefer aerosol methods; however, it has been shown 
that a test could be conducted with a less infectious agent, as the goal would be to test the 
delivery device rather than the success of resulting infections.202  This decreases the 
chance that testing the delivery device would lead to discovery of the plot due to the 
emergence of smallpox resulting from test. 
Constraints other than environmental conditions and testing options will arise 
depending on which method of smallpox dissemination is chosen.  It has been published 
that smallpox could potentially be dispersed in three ways: (1) by infecting an individual 
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and then engineering his close contact with his targets for infection;203 (2) by spreading 
smallpox in a liquid form via bomblets or sprayers;204 or (3) by spreading dried smallpox 
particles through the air.205  There is no consensus on whether all of these methods are 
likely to be successful, or which is the most likely option for a bioterrorist to choose.   
Some believe that “a fear-inducing hoax, or virus sprayed into a building’s air 
circulation system, or the use of nebulizers to infect thousands at a large airport, are all 
realistic scenarios.”206  It has also been speculated that “[t]errorists could put a solution 
of smallpox virus into hand-held atomizers, and station volunteers outside of such places 
as entertainment theme parks, military installations, and critical industries.  The virus 
could be sprayed directly into the faces of persons leaving such facilities, under the guise 
of marketing a new perfume, etc.”207  In these cases, commercially available products 
that produce aerosols are said to be suitable.  For example, the following products are 
thought to be sufficient for biological aerosol delivery in general: “truck-mounted 
sprayers, crop sprayers, 2 gallon garden sprayers, fire extinguishers, [and] cans of 
underarm deodorant.”208   
Others believe a more complex scenario is preferable, such as one in which a 
“large aerosol spray from a light airplane, such as a crop duster outfitted to release 
lyophilized smallpox virus over a public event such as a political rally or sports 
competition, is technically feasible.”209  Still others claim that a better scenario for 
transmission would be for a terrorist to infect himself and then spread his disease to 
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others in a public place.  Critics of this method maintain that the “concept of a volunteer 
suicidal terrorist who walks around a busy mall, or a big city subway, is unrealistic 
because smallpox renders people so sick that they would be avoided by the general 
public.”210  It is clear that there are multiple hypotheses for means of dispersal; the 
capabilities and limitations of each are addressed below. 
a. An Infected Terrorist 
This dispersal method, more than the others, has been described as suspect 
due to the incapacitation that the infective terrorist would likely experience due to his 
own illness and the exceptionally close contact that he would be required to generate in 
order to spread the virus.211  The historic record of smallpox transmission does not 
support scenarios such as a terrorist spreading disease by walking through a shopping 
mall; in the past, “large outbreaks in schools, for example, were uncommon.”212  
Nonetheless, this method is still referred to as being a credible method of starting an 
outbreak: “Variola virus could hypothetically be used as a weapon … through 
intentionally infecting one or more persons and encouraging them to circulate among 
groups of people, thereby exposing these contacts to variola virus infection.”213 
b. Liquid Smallpox in Bomblets or Sprayers 
A more plausible, although still difficult, method of dispersing smallpox 
would be to use the virus in its liquid form and disperse it from an explosive device or 
sprayer that would create a cloud of virus particles suspended in air.  Because the virus 
establishes itself in human hosts through inhalation, “spray or aerosol may be the likely 
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method of introduction.”214  These methods are not fool-proof; although liquid 
containing smallpox could be sprayed, devices such as garden sprayers “are not efficient 
in generating a small-particle, highly infectious (toxic) aerosol.”215  Spreading smallpox 
through a bomb can also provide uncertain results, as the explosion and its heat can harm 
the virus.216   
By 1947, the Soviet Union had decided to pursue this dispersal method at 
its Center of Virology in Zagorsk.217  They based this choice upon the characteristics of 
the disease: “it was highly infectious through the air, was rugged enough to survive 
explosive delivery, and caused a debilitating and demoralizing disease with high 
mortality.”218  The Soviet scientists always pursued weaponization of smallpox in its 
liquid form (as opposed to drying the virus into a powder); this was unusual compared to 
the means they used to weaponize other biological weapons, but the unique properties of 
smallpox made this difference important.219  Jonathan Tucker explains the reasons for the 
Soviet preference for weaponization of smallpox in its liquid form:  
As a rule, Soviet bioweaponeers preferred to manufacture bacterial or viral 
agents as a dry powder rather than as a wet slurry, because the dried agent 
had a significantly longer shelf life and could be disseminated more 
efficiently as an aerosol.  This principle did not apply to the smallpox 
weapon, however, because the liquid smallpox formulation retained its 
viability for months when deep-frozen and was extremely stable in aerosol 
form.  Moreover, dried smallpox virus posed an extreme hazard of 
infection to workers during the manufacturing process.  For these reasons, 
the Soviets always produced the virus in liquid form.220 
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The Soviet program replicated smallpox virus, stored it in liquid form in 
refrigerators, and used the liquid form to fill “cluster bomblets and spray tanks.”221  The 
“small melon-shaped bomblets … were packed into [ballistic missile refrigerated222] 
warheads and aerial bombs”223 and released at the end of their trajectory with parachutes 
and altitude sensors that aided in a timely release of the cloud of smallpox virus.224  
Though possible, it is unlikely that warheads with internal cooling mechanisms and 
intercontinental ballistic missiles would be a delivery method available to many 
bioterrorists today.  Former United States bioweaponeer Dr. William C. Patrick III calls 
this delivery through aircraft or missiles “not a very viable option today”225 because he 
does not “think anyone has the capability.”226 
One reason for this is that there are techniques that are required in order to 
make the smallpox solution suitable for remaining infective after exploding from its 
bomblets.  After the virus is harvested from the eggs, “the concentrated viral suspension 
was converted into a finished product by mixing it with a complex formula of chemical 
additives, including a stabilizer to prolong the viability of the virus in storage and an inert 
filling agent to facilitate its dispersal as a fine-particle aerosol.”227  Concerns of 
preserving this mixture until it is ready to be used must also be addressed.228  Although 
this process is scientifically complex, it is not overly time-consuming: “The total amount 
of time required to manufacture weapons-grade smallpox from the initial egg inoculation 
to the finished product was on the order of one week.”229 
                                                 
221 Tucker, “Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Dr. Kenneth 
Alibek,” 3. 
222 Tucker, Scourge, 142–143. 
223 Tucker, “Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Dr. Kenneth 
Alibek,” 3; Tucker, Scourge, 142. 
224 Tucker, Scourge, 142–143. 
225 William C. Patrick III, speech at Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy, “The 
Threat of Biological Warfare,” (February 13, 2001) http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/62.pdf (accessed 
February 12, 2012). 
226 Ibid. 




A second reason for the belief that this means of aerosol delivery might be 
beyond the reach of many actors is the highly technical systems that are involved.  One 
who wished to disseminate smallpox in this way would “develop sophisticated small 
bomblets that employ explosive or gaseous energy to disseminate liquid or dry agents 
efficiently.  These bomblets are usually released from missiles or high-performance 
aircraft.”230  Barring that, they would have the option of using “a high-performance 
aircraft with a storage tank attached or a cruise missile that contains its own agent and 
energy systems.”231  Aircraft and missiles are not readily or easily available for 
acquisition. 
c. Dried Smallpox Spread through the Air 
The vaccinated Soviet bioweaponeers determined that drying smallpox for 
dispersal was too dangerous to pursue.232  Ken Alibek, noted defector from the Soviet 
bioweapons proram, has said that he cannot “understand why some people make these 
scenarios using dry powder smallpox;”233 the liquid form is sufficiently stable and the 
dry form is exceptionally dangerous.234  Nevertheless, drying and disseminating viruses 
is possible; it is believed that if one “has the capability to produce viruses by means of 
tissue culture technology, then it would be possible to continue to process the liquid into 
a dry powder.”235   
The techniques required to complete this process are not negligible: “A 
dried agent with the desired properties—high agent concentration, small particle size and 
absence of electrostatic charge—requires serious development with skilled personnel and 
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sophisticated equipment.”236  There are benefits to this form of dissemination, though, 
that might be appealing to a terrorist.  For example, if a virus were dried correctly, it 
could “be efficiently disseminated from any number of devices that require only small 
amounts of energy.  The ABC fire extinguisher is a good example of such a system.”237  
Purchasing a dispersal machine like a fire extinguisher would likely be more available to 
a terrorist than the plane or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that are required for 
certain types of liquid dissemination. 
4. Weaponization Success in the Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union is now known to have “developed the largest and most 
advanced offensive BW program in history.”238  This program included a massive 
smallpox weaponization program that “far outstripped the efforts of other countries in 
both scale and sophistication.”239  Ken Alibek is the source of many of the specific 
details of the smallpox program, as he was responsible for its oversight.  He claims that in 
the 1970s the “Soviet military command issued an order to maintain an annual stockpile 
of twenty tons”240 of smallpox so they would not run out.  By the 1980s, the Soviets were 
cultivating “tons of smallpox in [the] secret lab in Zagorsk”241 and “more than 60 
thousand people were engaged in research, testing, production, and equipment design 
throughout the country.”242  In 1981 and 1987, Gorbachev revealed secret Five Year 
Plans to Alibek that included development of smallpox weaponization programs.243  In 
1990, Alibek believes that “close to a billion dollars”244 was spent on biological weapons  
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development.  By the end of the same year, he estimates that the production line for 
aerosol smallpox “was capable of manufacturing between 80 and 100 tons of smallpox a 
year.”245 
Although the existence of their program was a closely guarded secret for decades, 
details have since been revealed that shed light on the biological weaponization process 
in general, and that of smallpox in particular.  When the Soviets began their smallpox 
program, scientists carefully evaluated which strains of smallpox would be best to use in 
the biowarfare efforts, choosing strains based upon “best combination of militarily 
relevant characteristics, including low infectious dose and stability when dispersed as an 
invisible aerosol cloud.”246  Once they had chosen the particularly virulent India-1967 
strain, it was set up for Soviet-style mass-production: thousands of chicken eggs were 
taken from state-run farms, injected with smallpox, and incubated.247 
Although the scale and details of the program were unknown to the United States 
at the time, a hint that a smallpox weaponization program was taking place came from 
Kazakhstan in 1971.  Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea was a remote island in 
Kazakhstan where Soviet scientists are thought to have tested biological weapons from 
1952 until 1992.248  The facilities there were closed in 1992 when Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin acknowledged his country’s prolonged violation of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which had been ratified by the Soviet Union in 
1975.249 
One of the indications that the Soviet Union was, in fact, conducting open-air 
tests with its weaponized smallpox at Vozrozhdeniye Island comes from a study of 
documents recently translated from Russian describing an unreported outbreak of 
smallpox in Aralsk, Kazakhstan in 1971.  At this time, the disease had not been seen in 
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the region for nearly three decades, which would have made its appearance immediately 
suspect in the international community.250  The outbreak was not reported to the World 
Health Organization, and there is no evidence that the United States’ intelligence 
community was aware of it or of the associated smallpox weaponization testing program 
at the time.251 
Alan Zelicoff, an American medical doctor at Sandia National Laboratories who 
specializes in biological weapons, has conducted an epidemiological assessment of the 
outbreak based upon the Soviet reports written in 1971.  His assessment of the details of 
the outbreak led him to conclude that, “there is clear circumstantial evidence that the 
Soviets not only ‘weaponized’ smallpox but succeeded in aerosolizing it and, it appears, 
‘hardening’ the virus so that it maintained its infectivity as it traveled downwind over a 
distance of at least 15 kilometers.”252  Epidemiological and statistical comparison of the 
Aralsk outbreak to similar outbreaks in Yugoslavia and Pakistan also led Zelicoff to 
speculate that the Soviets were testing a particularly virulent form of the smallpox virus.  
He based these conclusions on the statistically significant higher proportions of 
hemorrhagic smallpox and greater incidence of transmission to those who were 
previously vaccinated.253  He says: 
The Soviet scientists managed, even with the limited technology of the 
time, to isolate a specific strain of smallpox that was not the routine 
smallpox we’re used to seeing in pictures, which typically has a mortality 
rate of one in three.  Instead, the virus seemed to cause hemorrhagic 
smallpox in unvaccinated individuals.  So, the Soviets had selected by far 
the worst kind of smallpox.  In hemorrhagic smallpox… the mortality rate 
is, for all intents and purposes, 100 percent.254   
These conclusions support Ken Alibek’s claims.  Still, some experts accept the 
Soviet claims about the likely sources of the outbreak, claims that Zelicoff clearly refutes 
in his report on the epidemic.  Notably, D.A. Henderson disagrees with Zelicoff’s 
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interpretation of what happened at Aralsk—that smallpox was transmitted off the island, 
to a passenger on a boat—because, he says, “it’s not possible to aerosolize smallpox.”255  
Most experts, however, have come to be convinced that Aralsk’s outbreak is proof that 
Soviet scientists: 
did something that experts in the United States said could never be done: 
They aerosolized smallpox in such a way that it could drift downwind 
many miles and still remain viable—that is, capable of causing infection.  
U.S. experts have long contended that this scenario was simply 
impossible.256 
Scholars from the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at 
Monterey Institute of International Studies’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies assess 
that since the terrorist attacks of 2001, “the U.S. government has been increasingly 
concerned about the possibility that terrorists could gain access to laboratory stocks of 
Variola virus and use it as a mass-casualty weapon.  As a result, learning more about the 
Soviet offensive BW program, especially its efforts to weaponize the smallpox virus, has 
acquired new urgency.”257  If it is true that the Soviet strain that infected Aralsk is more 
severe because it causes a greater chance of contracting hemorrhagic smallpox, Zelicoff 
is correct to point out that, “our complete reliance on a single vaccine (unmodified 
vaccinia) represents a serious potential vulnerability.”258   
Furthermore, a WHO inventory of the Russian stocks in 1999 revealed that the 
very strains responsible for this more lethal form of the disease were missing.259  The 
Russian government now maintains that these stocks were destroyed.  Notably, the same 
Russian official responsible for this claim—Lev Sandakchiev, the Director General of the 
smallpox repository in Koltsovo—does not acknowledge that the outbreak at Aralsk ever 
occurred.260 
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The international community has taken seriously the revelation of the Soviet 
Union’s smallpox weaponization program and its potential impact on the need for 
smallpox vaccine, until recently thought of as increasingly unnecessary after eradication 
in 1972.  After eradication, the WHO had recommended 200 million doses of smallpox 
vaccine be kept in its repository; a number that was chosen because that is the amount 
that was in their frozen storage at the time of the decision.261  In 1985, this stock was 
reduced to 5 million doses based on a recommendation from the WHO’s smallpox 
advisory committee and in response to WHO budget concerns.262  In response to 
concerns over the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program, in 2003 the smallpox 
advisory committee reversed its decision to lessen the amount of stored smallpox 
vaccine.263 The committee determined that the international emergency stockpile should 
be replenished to its previous level of 200 million doses of vaccine.  This was done both 
because of revelations about the Soviet weaponization program and the fact that it was 
unknown whether other countries had similar programs.264  The United States committed 
20 million doses to this vaccine storage replenishment cause.265  Clearly, the 
weaponization of smallpox was considered possible by top medical and government 
officials at this time. 
5.  Reliability of Sources Providing Claims of Success 
One of the primary sources for information about the success of smallpox 
weaponization is Doctor Kenneth Alibek, formerly known as Soviet Colonel Kanatjan 
Alibekov.  He has written a book, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest 
Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World– Told From the Inside by the Man 
Who Ran It, detailing his experiences as a major figure inside the Soviet Union’s 
biological warfare development programs.  Eventually he realized that the Americans 
were most likely not conducting a similar biological warfare program aimed at destroying 
                                                 






the Soviet Union (as he had been told).266  His disillusionment led him to leave the Soviet 
program and return to his family’s hometown in Kazakhstan.  After be learned of the 
expectation that he would begin a biological warfare program there, he chose to defect to 
the United States in 1992.267 
Intelligence and national security officials kept his arrival secret, and repeatedly 
questioned his shocking claims about the extent of the Soviet biological weapons 
programs.268  After his presence was more generally known, smallpox expert D.A. 
Henderson recalls,   
I had been repeatedly assured that he could not be believed; that he was 
fabricating information to obtain respect and special favors.  Finally I had 
the opportunity to converse at length with him, to read his book … and to 
talk with other Russian scientists.  Some assertions in the book may be 
questionable, but Alibekov’s detailed descriptions of the programs portray 
the disturbing reality of a massive and sophisticated biological weapons 
capacity.269 
Others, too, were skeptical, believing that intelligence experts were not 
knowledgeable enough about the scientific aspects of biological weapons engineering to 
know whether Alibek’s claims were credible.  For this reason, the CIA asked American 
biological weapons expert William C. Patrick III to assist with Alibek’s debriefing.270  
Patrick had been chief of the Product Development Division of the Agent Development 
and Engineering Directorate for the Army’s Biological Warfare laboratories at Fort 
Detrick, Maryland in the 1960s and 1970s when the U.S. military had dealt with 
biological warfare agents.271  In 2001, Dr. Patrick spoke at the Washington Roundtable 
on Science and Public Policy.  He referred specifically to Alibek’s descriptions of the 
Soviet Union’s high production capability, which he says people have asked him if he 
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believes.  He stands by Alibek’s claims, saying: “The answer is, I do….  I certainly 
believe these figures to be valid because when you look at their process, it all fitted into a 
logical sequence.”272 
Some details of Alibek’s claims have been confirmed over time.  For example, 
since his book was published, the Russian government has confirmed the existence of the 
1971 smallpox outbreak in Aralsk.  The deputy minister of health acknowledged in 2005 
that, “aerosolized smallpox virus experiments had been conducted during this period on 
the Aral Sea island.”273   
Other Soviet defectors have made claims similar to Alibek’s.  Vladimir Pasechnik 
defected to the United Kindgom in the late 1980s.  Pasechnik revealed the truth to the 
British government about Biopreparat—that it was the Soviet Union’s civilian cover 
agency for what was mainly the militarily controlled “principal government agency for 
biological weapons research and development.”274  One of the British government 
officials responsible for debriefing Pasechnik reported that, “[t]he information was 
stunning; a whole ministry exposed; billions of rubles spent; a complete organization 
shown to be a front; and there was the clear involvement of Gorbachev.”275  Alibek’s 
information supplemented and did not contradict what Pasechnik had reported. 
Although American scientists have by now vetted Alibek’s reports, it is important 
to note that while many consider him credible, his recollections are not universally 
accepted.  Some scientists refute his reports.  A Soviet scientist named Sergei Popov 
(who defected to Britain in 1992) questioned Alibek’s re-telling of Popov’s experiment to 
alter Legionnaire’s disease.  According to Popov, Alibek was wrong on three counts in 
his book Biohazard: he incorrectly described the experiments as using rabbits when they 
had in fact used guinea pigs; his description of the body being poisoned was inaccurate 
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(as it was the body’s reaction to the disease itself that caused the damage); and Alibek’s 
description of the implications of these studies was more benign than was actually the 
case.276  Although this example recounts what seem to be errors in relatively insignificant 
details, it does raise the question of the veracity of the finer details of Alibek’s reporting 
on projects with which he was not intimately involved.   
Although Alibek admits that he has no inside information on the state of Russia’s 
biological research programs since 1994,277 he claims in his 1999 book that he is 
“convinced that a large portion of the Soviet Union’s offensive program remains viable 
despite Yeltsin’s ban on research and testing.”278  He bases this claim in part from 
scientific research that has been published by his former colleagues, saying that it is 
similar to or has implications for research that was conducted in the weaponization 
programs.279  His unique insider’s perspective makes him one of the few qualified to 
make this assessment.   
6. “Brain Drain” from the Former Soviet Union? 
There has been speculation that the break-up of the Soviet Union and the rapid 
down-sizing of its BW programs have left a sizeable number of highly trained scientists 
unemployed, and knowledgeable enough about biological weapons to make their skills 
highly desirable to countries or terrorists seeking such a program.280  D.A. Henderson, a 
smallpox epidemiology expert and a key figure in the WHO’s eradication program, 
worries that some of the scientists who left the former Soviet Union for other countries:  
Were highly trained professionals, experienced in producing large 
quantities of virus and knowledgeable of experimental work that had 
endeavored to combine the smallpox virus with other viruses.  It was 
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possible that some of these scientists might have taken samples of the 
smallpox virus with them.  Also troubling was that recruiting teams from 
some Middle Eastern countries had visited VECTOR and other 
laboratories, offering generous consulting fees—and finding scientists 
willing to accept them.281 
Former Senator Frist describes Russia’s biological weapons program as the 
largest of the “eleven to seventeen countries [that] have biological weapons 
programs,”282  and therefore points to the biological weapons programs of the former 
Soviet Union as a possible source of the spread of biological weapons today.283  He 
echoes the commonly cited concern that the failure of the Soviet Union has led to a large 
number of unemployed scientists who would sell their biological weapons expertise.284  
The former senator concludes that:  
There remains a real concern that all of that expertise and technology 
could fall into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist organizations.  More 
than seven thousand scientists worked in the bioweapons program during 
the 1980s.  Many of them are now unemployed or working in less 
lucrative or challenging fields, and there is the very real concern that they 
could offer to sell their services and their technological know-how to the 
highest bidder.285  
These concerns seem valid based upon the terms of the “Joint Statement on 
Biological Weapons” agreement that Russia signed with the United States and Great 
Britain in 1992 after Russia’s failure to adhere to the terms of the BWC was admitted by 
President Yeltsin.286  According to the terms of this agreement, Russia would cut in half 
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its biological weapons workforce and would decrease funding for its military biological 
research weapons programs by 30 percent.287 
In an attempt to determine whether fear of this “‘brain drain’ phenomenon”288 is 
warranted, RAND Corporation conducted a study in 2005 entitled “Diversion of Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise from the Former Soviet Union: 
Understanding an Evolving Problem.”  First, the study found that although the number of 
personnel working with biological weapons was fairly certain in 1991, the numbers in 
subsequent years are mostly unknown.289  This highlights the “substantial uncertainties 
that persist [in]…understanding of the potential problem of weapons complex personnel 
diverting sensitive information.”290 
In spite of these uncertainties surrounding the number of actors potentially 
involved, the study found no evidence of actual illegal transfers of knowledge, materials, 
or weapons.291  The authors concluded that the: 
Empirical record of illicit knowledge diversion from the FSU [Former 
Soviet Union] over the past decade suggests that the barriers and 
disincentives have been much stronger than the incentives.  Additionally, 
U.S. policies may have periodically had significant impacts on the balance 
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Based upon their findings, they predict that this trend of disincentives outweighing 
incentives to sell Soviet secrets will continue.293 
Although RAND found no evidence of ill-intentioned scientists, states, or non-
state actors attempting to gain dangerous biological weapons materials or knowledge in 
this way, some sources nonetheless maintain that attempts have been made; however, the 
lack of evidence “of pathogen diversion by terrorists either through attacks or in collusion 
with former Soviet BW scientists”294 is telling.    
D. EVIDENCE OF INTENT OR CLAIM TO USE SMALLPOX AS A 
BIOWEAPON OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION 
1. Al Qaeda 
a. Al Qaeda’s Claims and Reasoning 
Members of al-Qaeda have developed and published their interpretation of 
Islamic law in an effort to claim it allows for biological weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction to be used by Muslims.295  In September 1999, Sheikh Omar Bakri 
Mohammed addressed a letter to Osama bin Laden that was published on the Internet.296  
It contained his interpretation of Islamic policy on killing with biological weapons: 
“Using any biological weapons in self defense is, in Islam, permissible, and I believe that 
we are currently operating under a defensive jihad.  Obviously we regret what could 
happen to innocent people, but there are always people who are war casualties.”297  
According to the Islamic rules (as interpreted by al Qaeda), “[i]f people of authority 
engaged in jihad determine that the evil of the infidels can be repelled by no other means 
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[than weapons of mass destruction], they may be used.”298  This is allowed “even if you 
kill them without exception,”299 as a smallpox epidemic would do. 
In a 2001 interview, Osama bin Laden claimed, “I wish to declare that if 
America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical 
and nuclear weapons.  We have the weapons as a deterrent.”300  In this particular 
statement he does not mention biological weapons; however, other al Qaeda leadership 
figures have claimed that al Qaeda “has in its possession… bombs with deadly viruses, 
which will spread fatal diseases throughout American cities.”301  One is left to wonder 
which deadly virus they claim to possess, but it is evident that nothing in their stated 
ideology indicates they would abstain from using those that they could attain. 
Osama bin Laden has stated that “it is a ‘holy duty’ to obtain biological 
weapons.”302  One of al Qaeda’s main spokesmen, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, reasoned in a 
2002 article that they:  
Have the right to kill four million Americans—two million of them 
children—and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of 
thousands.  Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and 
biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that have 
afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans’] chemical and biological 
weapons.303 
Smallpox is a disease that could kill millions of Americans, but it is unlikely that this 
rhetoric is any more indicative of intent to pursue such an attack than the Internet 
requests for prayers to spread “epidemics and scourges”304 through America. 
Al Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri has gone beyond arguing about whether 
Islamic law allows it, to consider the best way to carry out a biological warfare program.  
                                                 
298 Aaron, In Their Own Words, 295. 
299 Ibid. 
300 Aaron, In Their Own Words, 293. 
301 Ibid. 
302 Venzke and Ibrahim, The al-Qaeda Threat, 21. 
303 Ibid., 23. 
304 Ibid., 21. 
 61
In a note to Muhammad Atef, he explains that “looking for a specialist is the fastest, 
safest, and cheapest way [to embark on a biological and chemical weapons program].”305  
This letter seems to conclude with a decision that chemical weapons are a more 
achievable option for al Qaeda to pursue.306 
b. Assessments about al Qaeda 
According to Gavin Cameron’s studies of WMD terrorism, “the evidence 
clearly shows that al-Qa’eda has simply been trying to develop any type of weapon that 
might help its cause… [and that] given the difficulty and expense of acquiring and 
effectively using such weapons, al-Qa’eda may continue to seek WMD, but probably not 
rely on doing so successfully.”307  Because the World Trade Center attacks demonstrated 
that an attack that does not involve a biological weapon can cause a large number of 
casualties, it is not a foregone conclusion that a group such as al Qaeda might choose to 
pursue smallpox.  In fact, its use of conventional weapons in the 2001 attacks, “albeit in 
an unusual and highly innovative way,”308 demonstrates that this group may have a 
preference for conventional versus biological weapons.   
In recent years, there has been speculation surrounding this preference as 
to whether al Qaeda terrorists might seek to use biological weapons against the United 
States.  In 2002, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet testified to the 
U.S. Joint Inquiry Committee that al Qaeda had “attempted to acquire material used in 
pursuing a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) capability.”309  Later that 
year, he reported to the Senate Committee on Armed Services that al Qaeda documents 
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revealed that “bin Ladin was pursuing a biological weapons research program.”310  These 
reports give general information about biological weapons, and mention agents such as 
anthrax, plague, botulinum, and hepatitis.311  They do not mention smallpox specifically.   
In 2003, a special projects reporter for The Washington Post named Barton 
Gellman wrote an article about al Qaeda’s search for biological weapons.  In it he cited 
CIA and White House officials as telling him that, “there was no U.S. intelligence 
assessment that al-Qaeda was looking for smallpox.”312  When he learned from a 
separate source that this was not the case, he confronted the officials again and they 
confirmed that a presentation to “top White House senior officials”313 did exist; in the 
brief, read to him by his initial source, al Qaeda was assessed to be “interested in 
acquiring biological weapons, to include smallpox.”314  
The report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, written in 2005, gives an 
unclassified summary of the intelligence community’s assessment of al Qaeda’s likely 
biological terrorism capabilities, and reports that al Qaeda’s biological weapons program 
was “further along… than pre-war intelligence indicated.”315  The unclassified report 
makes no mention of smallpox in the two pages devoted to biological terrorism, although 
al Qaeda in Afghanistan was reported to have a program devoted to an unnamed Agent 
X.316  After a close study and cross-referencing of all available related documents, Milton  
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Leitenberg, a specialist in biological warfare and arms control, concludes that Agent X 
“almost certainly refers to anthrax, with botulinum toxin the most plausible second 
guess.”317 
In 2005, the Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
reported to Congress his agency’s assessment that al Qaeda was interested in biological 
weapons, but their capability to act on this was not certain.318  He says, “Because they are 
easier to employ, we believe terrorists are more likely to use biological agents such as 
ricin or botulinum toxin or toxic industrial chemicals to cause casualties.”319  The ease of 
employment argument does not necessarily carry over to smallpox due to the complicated 
process that must occur before employment (namely, acquisition and weaponization; see 
abover). 
Although al Qaeda has made frequent public mention of its intent to kill 
and of its considerations regarding the use of biological weapons, there has been no 
specific mention of smallpox.  The group has made public some of its training and 
ideology surrounding other types of weapons; for example, instructions on use of 
weapons such as rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) can be found on the Internet alongside how-to guides on more primitive attack 
methods such as booby traps and using spoiled food or nicotine as a poison.320  The 
group does not appear hesitant to reveal what types of weapons it is considering.  It is 
clear that the group is willing to use many means of attack less complex than spreading 
smallpox, but this does not prove whether or not such an attack is one that they would 
consider. 
In 2005, “al-Qaeda chief propagandist Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, also 
known as Abu Musab al-Suri, posted a 15-page document entitled ‘Biological 
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Weapons’”321 that contained lessons on how to turn pneumonic plague into an aerosol 
weapon.322  Other publications have discussed biological weapons that are less damaging 
than WMDs; one training manual’s chapter on assassinations with poison intentionally 
limits the discussion “to poisons that the holy warrior can prepare and use without 
endangering his health.”323  This suggests that they might believe dangerous biological 
agents such as smallpox are beyond the means of many of their intended audience.  
Another example of intent to use biological weapons comes from the United Kingdom, 
where in 2003 a suspected member of al Qaeda was arrested with materials that 
authorities assessed could have been used to create ricin or botulinum toxin.324  These are 
indications that al Qaeda terrorists are considering biological weapons; however, none of 
these examples provide evidence of a specific pursuit of smallpox.   
Although some have claimed that, “there is evidence that al-Qaeda was 
experimenting with chemical and biological agents in Afghanistan during the Taliban 
regime,”325 others maintain that this is unlikely.  These people claim that, “there is no 
objective evidence that al-Qaeda or any other jihadi group in fact has such weapons.”326  
Evidence from 2002 seems to support this claim: “Al Qaeda has expressed interest in 
using unconventional weapons and has experimented with industrial chemical hazards as 
terrorist weapons, as evidenced by documents and materials found in Afghanistan by 
U.S. forces in 2002, but it has not used CB hazards in any terrorist attacks.”327  Clearly 
there is a lack of consensus on which type of weapons al Qaeda actually possesses as 
compared to what the organization wishes to possess.  It should also be noted that the 
argument that al Qaeda has not yet used a biological agent in an attack has no bearing on 
whether this could happen in the future. 
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2. Iraq 
Iraq signed the BWC in 1972 and ratified it in 1991.  In 1995, Saddam Hussein’s 
son-in-law Hussein Kamal defected from Iraq and provided details to the United Nations 
about Iraq’s biological weapons program in the previous decade.328  The documentation 
he produced contained information about Iraq’s anthrax production and weaponization 
program, but mentioned nothing about smallpox.329  Although it was later proven that the 
anthrax program had ended, alarmists remained convinced that Iraq—as well as other 
nations—might be secretly pursuing biological warfare in spite of signing the BWC.330  
These suspicions were reinforced by reports from former Soviet scientists that in 1995 
Iraq had attempted to buy fermenters and air filtration equipment from Russia that the 
Russians presumed were to be used for plague production rather than for animal-feed as 
the Iraqis claimed.331 
Also in the 1990s, at a time when Iraq had in place a military doctrine to use 
biological weapons as a state-sanctioned military strategy, the country was found to have 
research programs in camelpox.332  Although camelpox is not one of the four members of 
the Orthopox genus that is capable of infecting humans,333 it is closely related to 
smallpox genetically; the two viruses share genes that are “greater than 90% 
identical.”334  This has led to speculation that Iraq was either intending to infect camels, 
or to conduct research and development with an agent that was similar enough to 
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smallpox to be useful, but was safer for humans to handle and less likely to reveal the 
true intent of the program if it were discovered.335 
Dr. Richard Spertzel, head of the biological weapons inspections for the United 
Nations Special Commission on Iraq from 1994 to 1998, testified to the House 
Committee on International Relations in December 2001 that one of the biological agents 
of concern in Iraq was smallpox.336  He summarizes his assessment of Iraq’s smallpox 
capability: 
Iraq does not acknowledge any studies on smallpox.  However, a smallpox 
epidemic swept through northern Iraq in the mid 1970s, just two to three 
years after it embarked on a program to acquire the capability for weapons 
of mass destruction.  It is most unlikely that Iraq would have missed the 
opportunity to acquire clinical samples for any biological agent that might 
be of future benefit to the government.  Thus it is prudent to make the 
assumption that Iraq possesses the necessary seed material for smallpox 
production.  It has the necessary facilities, expertise and equipment for 
such development.  A number of other clues strongly suggests that indeed 
it had an interest if not an active program in such a weapon 
development.337 
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) provided to Congress in October 2002, 
titled Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, details what was 
believed at the time to be a likely estimate of the regime’s biological warfare capabilities.  
An excerpt from the Key Judgments reads:  
We judge that all key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of 
Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger 
and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.  We judge Iraq 
has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly 
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producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents….  Chances are even 
that smallpox is part of Iraq’s offensive BW program.338 
In the years since this report was published, it has become accepted that the actual 
threat posed by Iraq’s biological weapons program was much lower than estimated; it 
was probable that the intelligence community had succumbed to the pressures of 
interpreting information in the manner that they believed politicians wanted to hear.339  
The assertions made in this NIE were later determined to be based upon unreliable 
sources and “flimsy intelligence.”340   
In 2003, inspection teams comprised of American scientists known as “Team 
Pox” searched for three months and were unable to find any “physical or anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that Iraq was producing smallpox or had stocks of it in its 
possession.”341  Barton Gellman, a reporter who visited the top ninety suspected weapons 
site with the inspectors in May 2003, confirmed that no weapons of mass destruction 
were found.342   
Based upon the evidence, it is unlikely that Iraq possessed a smallpox 
weaponization program at the time of the inspections.  The report to the House 
Committee on International Relations, the NIE, and a subsequent article in The 
Washington Post likely provide much of the basis for later reports that Iraq possesses 
smallpox.343 
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3. Iran 
Iran signed the BWC in 1972 and ratified it in 1973.  The country claims that it 
upholds its commitment to this international treaty and therefore does not maintain an 
offensive biological warfare program; however, some lend more credence to assessments 
that “[m]ilitary analysts believe its program could still be active….  Iran receives a good 
deal of support from Russia and China, including production technology and expertise in 
chemical and biological manufacturing that could be used to create an advanced and self-
sufficient military CB warfare capability.” 344   
Although such a biological warfare capability has not yet materialized, some 
claim evidence that Iran is putting the pieces in place to have such a program.   In their 
study of the diversion of biological weapons expertise from the former Soviet Union, the 
RAND Corporation found that “[i]n the biological sector, there have been several 
instances in which Iran sought information or materials from Russian biological 
institutes.  In one case, Iranian agents were negotiating a deal with Vector, one of 
Russia’s premier biological research centers that previously performed important 
weapons research.”345  United States threats to cut financial assistance to Russia 
prevented that particular deal from being finalized.346   
Iranian interest in this particular facility could indicate an interest in scientists 
familiar with smallpox.  Vector was more than a premier research center; in 1990 it had 
been central to the Soviet smallpox weaponization program, with a production capability 
of 80-100 tons of smallpox each year and a research program focused on genetically 
altered strains of smallpox.347 
Iranian interest in recruiting those former Soviet scientists knowledgeable about 
biological weapons production has been alleged by those involved.  Gennady 
Lepyoshkin, a former Soviet colonel who had run the biological weapons facility at 
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Stepnogorsk, Kazahkstan, reported that Iran had attempted recruitment of the scientists 
there.348  In the cases to which he refers, the Soviet scientists turned down the Iranian 
offers.  Whether other offers have been made elsewhere is unknown; Ken Alibek claims 
to have heard from former colleagues that five scientists involved in biological warfare 
programs now live and work in Iran.349 
4. North Korea 
North Korea is frequently lumped in with Russia, Iraq, and Iran when smallpox 
biological weapons capabilities are mentioned.350  In the House Committee on 
International Relations report, however, the only mention of North Korea in conjunction 
with biological weapons is: “It is estimated that at least 20 countries, including … North 
Korea … either have active research programs or were formerly involved in biological 
weapons research and production.”351 
Other reports are similarly anecdotal.  Ken Alibek alleges that in 1994 the Russian 
defense ministry sent biological warfare scientists to North Korea, and “the purpose of 
their visit is still unknown.”352  He has heard from others that several scientists from the 
Soviet Union’s biological weapons program have relocated to North Korea.353  Lev 
Sandakchiev, Director of the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (also 
called Vector), said in 1999 that “he was certain that North Korea, among other countries, 
was secretly keeping smallpox, and American analysts shared his view.”354  As he was 
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simply arguing against destruction of the remaining legally stored stocks of the smallpox 
virus, he did not explain the reasons for his “certainty.”  
Other reports come from South Korea, and from the United States Forces Korea 
(USFK) stationed there.  USFK’s open source collection on North Korea has allowed 
them to summarize North Korea’s relationship to biological weapons as follows: 
Pyongyang has taken advantage of the BWC’s verification gap by using 
its position as a state party to the BWC in order to blanket accusations that 
it continues to produce and maintain biological weapons. The South 
Korean Defence Ministry claims that North Korea has possession of 
several biological agents such as anthrax bacterium, botulinum and 
smallpox—all of which can be weaponized. However, South Korean and 
US intelligence assessments about North Korea’s BW program remain 
highly speculative due to the nebulous nature of biological agents and 
their use.355 
In addition to these claims that North Korea is in possession of smallpox, South 
Korean newspapers reported in 2011 that South Korea’s defense ministry “estimates that 
North Korea owns up to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons and is capable of growing 
anthrax, smallpox and cholera.”356  It is possible that the smallpox claims come from the 
fact that the North Korean military continues to vaccinate its forces against smallpox.357  
The fact that vaccinations are given does not imply a capability to produce weaponized 
smallpox; immunity could just as easily be desired as a measure of protection against a 
suspected attack rather than as an offensive measure.358 
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Al Qaeda has demonstrated an interest in biological weapons, and has the 
ideology that would sanction their use, but there is no evidence that the group is pursuing 
smallpox specifically.  Although it was widely assumed that Iraq had a capable biological 
weapons program that could include smallpox, inspections revealed no trace of the virus.  
Iran claims not to have an offensive biological weapons program, yet has allegedly 
reached out to scientists at former Soviet biological weaponization facilities.  There is no 
evidence that Iran possess the virus or the weaponization programs to spread it, but its 
interest marks biological weapons––not necessarily smallpox––as a potential future 
endeavor.  Little is known about North Korea’s biological warfare programs, but claims 
have been made that it possesses samples of the virus.  As has been demonstrated, there 
are many resources required and scientific difficulties to overcome before a sample of 
smallpox virus could be used as a biological weapon. 
It is clear that the barriers to terrorist use of smallpox as a biological weapon are 
significant; in many cases they are likely to be prohibitive.  The following chapters will 
assume, however, that these hurdles are surmountable and that terrorists could, in fact, 
successfully weaponize smallpox.  This assumption allows for consideration of terrorist 
decision-making.  Chapter III will address whether terrorists are likely to choose to use 
smallpox as a bioweapon over their other options for terrorist actions based upon their 
rational or irrational considerations.  Chapter IV considers the impact that domestic and 
international law would have as a deterrent to choosing to pursue bioterrorism.   
 72
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 73
III. WHAT KINDS OF TERRORISTS MIGHT PURSUE 
SMALLPOX AS A BIOWEAPON 
A. DOES THIS TYPE OF ATTACK MATCH A PARTICULAR IDEOLOGY? 
In this chapter, I will examine whether terrorists would be likely to choose to 
carry out a biological attack using smallpox based upon what might motivate them to 
pursue it as a bioweapon.  As Gavin Cameron points out about weapons of mass 
destruction in general, both capability and intent of the group or individual conducting 
the attacks are important to consider.359  Jessica Stern adds that motivation is a third 
important factor.360  Capability, intent, and motivation are equally important to consider 
when evaluating whether terrorists are willing and able to carry out an attack using 
smallpox as a weapon.   
Chapter II deals with the question of capability.  In brief, the debate centers on the 
characteristics of the smallpox virus.  One commonly cited claim is that the nature of the 
smallpox virus itself makes it unsuitable for use as a biological weapon.  As discussed in 
depth in Chapter II, just to handle the virus, sophisticated laboratory equipment, top 
security facilities, and highly specific knowledge of microbiology and virology are 
required.  Some say that to turn it into a weapon requires even greater skill and funding 
than terrorists are likely to possess.361 
This chapter addresses the questions of motivation and intent.  The specific 
characteristics of the virus may or may not make smallpox an appealing weapon, 
depending on the goals and intent of the individuals or groups who choose to pursue its 
use as a weapon.  The focus here is on the factors that would likely impact a terrorist’s 
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decision to pursue or avoid smallpox as a bioweapon.  In this chapter, the analysis 
follows an assumption that terrorists would be capable of overcoming the technological 
difficulties and costs associated with virus acquisition, laboratory requirements, 
weaponization, and safe handling.  An assumption that these processes could be mastered 
by a terrorist organization allows this chapter to focus on whether the use of smallpox as 
a bioweapon is likely given the motivations of terrorists who would potentially choose to 
use it. 
Two sets of data validate narrowing the investigation based upon this assumption.  
First, evidence from the Soviet Union proves that clandestine weaponization is possible.  
Although significant resources were devoted to this state-directed project that might not 
be available to terrorist actors today, the Soviet case demonstrates that the likelihood of 
determined actors pursuing smallpox weaponization deserves consideration.362  Some of 
the factors that might influence a terrorist’s calculus of whether smallpox will be his 
bioweapon of choice are: the virus is likely to be difficult to obtain;363 smallpox is 
challenging to work with safely;364 and there is a vaccine available for unvaccinated 
victims and many others are at least partially immune, which would lessen the 
effectiveness of an attack.365 
Second, smallpox virus can be genetically engineered based on the scientific 
research that has been carried out and publicized since its eradication.  Because the 
process of synthesizing smallpox virus DNA is thought to be technologically feasible, 
from the terrorist point of view, the problem of initially acquiring the smallpox virus 
could be significantly altered, as he might have the option to create the smallpox virus 
synthetically in a laboratory (rather than relying on finding or stealing historically stored 
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samples).366  Synthetic engineering of viruses, however, is a complex procedure, so 
direct acquisition would be preferable if it were possible.  
The chapter now turns to the debate about the novelty of contemporary terrorists’ 
motivations and the factors that influence their decisions surrounding types of weapons 
used.  There is division in the field of terrorism scholarship over whether terrorist 
decision-making is rational or irrational.  While some claim that ideology leads to 
irrational decision-making, others believe that even ideologically motivated terrorists take 
into account factors such as the terrorist organization’s survival and reputation, as well as 
the ease of means used to achieve its ends. The following sections describe the 
ideological frameworks that might influence terrorists’ goals and choice of methods.  
Rational considerations such as organizational and individual survival and the 
comparative ease of conventional over biological weapons are shown to be motivators 
that would likely lead a terrorist to choose a means of terrorism other than a smallpox 
attack. 
1. “New” Terrorism 
The current terrorism literature is divided over whether the last decade or two has 
shown development of a new kind of terrorist motivation that is significantly different 
from the world’s historical experiences with terrorism.   Involvement of extreme religious 
motivation, level of lethality of attacks, and desire that greater results be realized from the 
terrorist acts are characteristics that some believe imply that terrorism today is different 
from in the past.  These are precisely the characteristics that many suppose would 
describe a group with a propensity to use WMDs, arguably making these weapons a more 
real threat today.367 
Terrorism scholars who are proponents of the idea that there is a “new terrorism” 
claim that “new motivations and different capabilities”368 exemplify a break from the 
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world’s past experiences with terrorism in a way that is newly and uniquely dangerous to 
Western society today.369  According to these scholars, this “new” terrorism: 
Pursues broad, ideological/religious goals so utopian as to be unattainable 
in the real world.  With God on their side or at least with an unshakable 
faith in some vision of the future behind them, these zealots kill in pursuit 
of their millenarian vision, restrained only by the means at their 
disposal.370   
These types of terrorists are “thought to be more inclined to use highly lethal methods in 
order to destroy an impure world and bring about the apocalypse.”371  Although Martha 
Crenshaw is not a proponent of this idea that today’s terrorism is fundamentally different 
from the past, she accurately summarizes “new” terrorism’s purported distinction from 
“old” terrorism, saying that “new” terrorism:  
Is motivated by religious belief and is more fanatical, deadly, and 
pervasive than the older and more instrumental forms of terrorism the 
world had grown accustomed to…. [It] is thought to differ from the ‘old’ 
terrorism in terms of goals, methods, and organization.372   
 The proponents of “new” terrorism have studied the motivation behind recent acts 
of terrorism and have observed that terrorist actors are increasingly drawn to create 
events that are highly symbolic and dramatic.373  Ideological motivations could provide 
the basis for such a large and dramatic attack.  Terrorists motivated by religion might 
display their “dedication to a provocative and shocking form of violence” by causing 
sensational damage.374  Because of their belief that their actions have divine backing, 
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these types of terrorists “seem far less likely to worry about the consequences of their 
actions and far more willing to engage in mass killing”375 than the more traditional types 
of terrorists who are concerned with gaining support for their cause.  The use of 
weaponized smallpox would necessitate such a disregard for consequences.  Its high 
fatality rate would put smallpox in the category of an attack that is sensational, dramatic, 
and lethal, and in line with the “indiscriminate killing”376 that terrorism scholar Walter 
Laqueur claims is the current trend in terrorist tactics. 
 One explanation for this motivation in terrorists driven by religious fervor is their 
tendency to believe that their cause is part of a divine war.  Portraying “the dichotomous 
image of the conflict [as]… ‘amplified’ into an image of military war,” provides terrorists 
with a clear enemy.377  Because this enemy acts against God’s will, the violence is 
justified.  In a cosmic struggle, there is no room for compromise; this belief in the 
absolute rightness of their actions provides these terrorists with a moral sanction.378   
 For example, religiously motivated terrorists could construe a deadly 
transmissible disease such as smallpox as a plague on non-believers or enemies of God’s 
plan.  If a terrorist believes that his actions are justified by God, it is possible that he 
would consider a large-scale attack.  Two examples illustrate this belief.  First, Shoko 
Asahara, the leader of Aum Shinrikyo, explained to his followers that the conflict 
between good and evil warranted the use of any kind of weapon to bring about the 
Armageddon that God had revealed to him.379  Second, al Qaeda has reasoned that God 
allows the use of biological weapons against non-believers when conducting a defensive 
jihad.380  Smallpox would certainly qualify as a weapon that would further both groups’ 
aims in this regard. 
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   If, as these proponents of “new” terrorism claim, terrorists today require a large, 
dramatic, symbolic attack, then this type of terrorist could find value in resorting to 
WMDs.  If mass casualty is not a goal that is aligned with terrorists’ desired outcome, 
however, terrorist actors would not be likely to prefer smallpox.  In making an argument 
against the likelihood of terrorists choosing to use nuclear weapons, Brian Jenkins has 
claimed that terrorists might not be inclined toward huge numbers of casualties, saying: 
“Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of 
people dead.”381  Until the terrorist attacks of 2001, many terrorism scholars agreed with 
Jenkins’ conclusion that “killing a lot of people has seldom been a terrorist objective…. 
Terrorists operate on the principle of the minimum force necessary.  They find it 
unnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for their purposes.”382  Other 
scholars, however, have determined through a more recent historical review of instances 
of terrorism that “the argument that terrorists want publicity is clearly no longer the sole 
motivation for many groups and the concept that such organizations do not want a lot of 
people dead is also questionable.”383  If the latter scholars are correct, the motivation to 
use smallpox as a weapon could be considered plausible. 
 Terrorism scholars who have examined historical trends of terrorism do not all 
agree with this assessment that terrorist ideology today is identified by propensity to 
create larger and deadlier attacks.  They maintain that the term “new terrorism” misleads 
us to believe that terrorist methods today are increasingly focused on killing in large 
numbers purely because of religious convictions of the attackers, when, in fact, this is not 
the case.384  Martha Crenshaw and others have demonstrated that claims of an entirely 
“new” form of terrorism that is more deadly than in the past should be generally 
considered an erroneous and unfounded interpretation of the recent examples of terrorist 
history.385  As Crenshaw points out, a historical analysis of instances of terrorism reveals 
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that “religious terrorists have not been quick to resort to weapons of mass destruction,”386 
and furthermore, the “data on which the association between religion and mass casualties 
is based are incomplete.”387  Crenshaw finds an “absence of empirical evidence for many 
claims about a ‘new’ terrorism, particularly in the likelihood of the use of weapons of 
mass destruction.”388  The “new” label is misleading because “levels of selectivity [in 
choice of targets] and restraint vary across groups and across time, but not according to a 
religious–secular or past–present divide.”389  David Rapoport agrees that a historical 
overview of terrorist actions does not bear out that religious conviction is a motivator for 
large-scale violence.390  Although this does not rule out the possibility of those with 
religious conviction ever killing in large numbers in the future, it is unlikely that religious 
or moral motivations alone indicate a preference to choose smallpox as a bioterror 
weapon. 
2. Compared to Suicide Terrorism 
Extreme ideology or conviction would likely also motivate a terrorist who 
attempted to use his body as a means of transmitting smallpox.  Studies conducted on the 
“modern phenomenon”391 of suicide terrorism have concluded that “religious fanaticism 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor in suicide terrorist attacks.”392  Therefore, the 
previous debate surrounding religious conviction as an insufficient potential motivation 
for pursuing this type of biological warfare attack is strengthened.  Religion by itself is 
not likely to convince a terrorist to conduct a smallpox attack on others or to accept the 
fact that he will die in the process of unleashing such a disease.  In fact, even though 
there might exist “the microsociety of a terrorist group…that provides the social milieu 
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amenable to generating self-sacrificial suicide … the great majority of terrorist groups, 
regardless of their structure, have not resorted to suicide attacks.”393     
In spite of these assessments, many cases of suicide terrorism have occurred.   
Suicide terrorism scholar Robert Pape has catalogued eighteen campaigns (consisting of 
multiple attacks each) from 1980 to 2003.394  In the majority of these attacks, death of the 
suicide terrorist occurs through vehicle bombs, belt bombs, or similar explosive 
means.395  It is clear that those who are strongly committed to their cause sometimes 
come to believe that their death, though violent, can help to achieve a goal.396  Even 
those willing to kill themselves for a cause, however, might not choose to do so using 
smallpox.  The likelihood of suffering a slow, painful death––compared to death that 
comes quickly from something like an explosion––could be a factor that makes suicide-
by-smallpox less appealing than more traditional means of suicide terrorism.    
Additionally, as there is no way of knowing in advance whether a case of 
smallpox will be fatal, an informed terrorist might consider the fact that blindness and/or 
disfiguration––rather than death––could be the result of his actions.  Suicide terrorists 
who would consider killing themselves through an explosion or similar means might be 
less willing to suffer the symptoms that sickness from smallpox would bring.  For these 
reasons, even a terrorist who otherwise possesses the conviction to die for a cause might 
not be willing to attempt to do so via smallpox. 
If he was willing, however, as Chapter II notes, it is generally held to be 
scientifically improbable that a smallpox epidemic could be started in a manner similar to 
a suicide mission.  One member of the Centers for Disease Control’s team who studies  
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smallpox outbreak models has called such as scenario “absolutely preposterous.”397  A 
terrorist who believes these assessments would likely be deterred from using this method 
due to its low chance of success. 
3. Rational Considerations as Possible Deterrents 
A terrorist who makes decisions rationally must consider the impact that his goals 
and methods will have on his individual survival, and that of his organization.  He must 
also weigh the impact of a decision to violate the potential taboo against killing with 
biological weapons.  Additionally, conventional weapons have advantages over a 
smallpox weapon that might be more appealing to terrorist actors. 
In making this decision between biological and conventional weapons, the 
terrorist would likely consider the advantages brought by each.  Conventional weapons 
are generally cheaper and easier to obtain and use than biological weapons.398  Unlike 
biological weapons, conventional weapons will not infect those who are exposed to 
them.399  Conventional weapons can be, however, sometimes dangerous to those who 
work on them.  For example, a bomb-maker faces significant risk of explosion while 
constructing his weapon.   
Even if a terrorist did choose to pursue biological weapons instead of 
conventional ones, there are biological agents that are easier to obtain, produce, and 
control than smallpox.  Anthrax is one example of a biological agent that can be found in 
nature, that is relatively easily reproduced in large quantities in a short amount of time, 
and that does not spread uncontrollably from person to person.400  These factors 
demonstrate that within the range of possible agents for use in biological terrorism, there 
are less complex agents available to choose than smallpox.  Groups committed to a 
biological attack, therefore, are more likely to use agents other than smallpox. 
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Most groups, however, will probably still choose to use conventional over 
biological options.  Another advantage of conventional weapons is that they have shown 
demonstrable historical successes when compared to biological weapons.401  There are 
fewer historical instances of successful biological attacks than conventional weapon 
attacks that potential terrorists can look to for planning guidance.402  Some scholars have 
used case studies to conclude that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that work as expected 
vice those that could produce unknown results.403  Bruce Hoffman has concluded that: 
The operational conservatism inherent in the terrorists’ organizational 
imperative to succeed… [will keep them from] embark[ing] on grandiose 
operations involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that carry with 
them the potential to kill on a much larger scale….  [W]ithout exception 
the terrorists’ weapons have remained exclusively conventional… and 
have mostly conformed to long-established patterns of previous terrorist 
operations.404 
The risks from conventional weapons are likely preferable to most terrorists, as they are 
more predictably assessed than the risks associated with contagious and transmissible 
viruses.  These criteria would likely tip the scales in favor of terrorists choosing to use 
conventional weapons such as guns and bombs over the more complicated alternative of 
weaponizing a transmissible deadly disease. 
Not all terrorist groups, however, have considered these to be adequate deterrents 
from pursuing unconventional weapons.  Aum Shinrikyo attempted ten chemical attacks 
and ten biological attacks between 1990 and 1995.405  Clearly, what some have perceived 
as advantages to conventional weapons did not deter them from pursuing biological 
weapons such as botulinum toxin, anthrax, Q fever, and chemical weapons such as sarin 
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gas, VX gas, and hydrogen cyanide.406  The case of Aum Shinrikyo may not be an 
exemplar of the norm; Jessica Stern points out through her rational actor model of 
terrorist motivation for using unconventional weapons that “terrorists who hope to 
influence policy (rather than to destroy the government outright or kill for its own sake) 
are unlikely to resort to mass destruction.”407  As long as terrorists believe that their long-
term goals can be met by means other than spreading a deadly transmissible disease, they 
might choose not to follow Aum Shinrikyo’s example.  Furthermore, although the cult 
had intended to kill thousands of people through biological attacks, the fact that their 
attempts proved unsuccessful could inform future terrorist decision-making.408  Aum 
Shinrikyo’s demonstrated failures with chemical and biological attacks could make CBW 
less attractive, as terrorists are unlikely to attempt to duplicate methods that have proven 
unsuccessful in the past.  
Ehud Sprinzak claims that “the flourishing mystique of chemical and biological 
weapons suggests that angry and alienated groups are likely to manipulate them for 
conventional political purposes.”409  Despite this conclusion, Sprinzak would likely agree 
that smallpox as a weapon would not be one that falls within this category because the 
“growing interest in…biological weapons” that he has studied was primarily related to 
“small-scale tactical attacks.”410  An attack using smallpox, even among a partially 
vaccinated population, would spread the disease and would not be considered small-
scale. 
Other considerations that are likely terrorist concerns are factors such as 
organization survival and loss of support for the group after a smallpox attack.  Would 
the use of smallpox hurt a terrorist organization?  If so, what might explain or justify the 
use of this exceptionally deadly bioterror weapon? 
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a. Impact on Organization 
Martha Crenshaw’s analysis of terrorist organizations has demonstrated 
that “acts of terrorism may be motivated by the imperative of organizational survival” 
and that it is important to both the leaders and members within the organization that the 
group survives.411  A terrorist using a communicable disease such as smallpox as a 
bioweapon would have to consider both surviving the infection that has been set loose as 
well as surviving the reprisals and retaliation that are likely to come from conducting 
such a serious attack.412  Biological weapons, more than conventional weapons, pose the 
risk of injury or death to greater numbers of the terrorist’s own group or supporters.413    
While a conventional attack is likely limited to impacting a particular location, a 
smallpox attack would cause infections that would spread unpredictably.  This makes a 
conventional attack (or a biological or chemical attack that could be contained to a local 
area) one that could potentially produce less harsh reprisals than a high-impact biological 
attack such as smallpox.  The perception that a conventional attack might bring about less 
severe retaliation could impact a terrorist’s decision not to use a biological weapon such 
as smallpox. 
Releasing a deadly disease such as smallpox could alienate the terrorist 
organization from the society among which it was living, assuming the source of the 
attack was attributed correctly.  Because releasing smallpox has no guarantee that an 
attack against outsiders would not also spread to cause infection among local supporters, 
it is unlikely that the terrorist organization would perceive such a lethal and uncontrolled 
event as one that would not have potential to harm its cause.  By potentially killing 
(rather than protecting or coexisting with) their supporters, the terrorists would likely lose 
their support and the appearance of legitimacy if it was known that they were the 
perpetrators.  Because smallpox is no longer present in nature, terrorist release would be 
implicated in a smallpox epidemic today.  Depending on how well the terrorist 
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organization’s goals and methods are known to its supporters, suspicions of the 
outbreak’s origin may or may not be aroused in the terrorist group’s community.  
b. Belief in a Moral Sanction 
Martha Crenshaw has observed that although attention and recognition of 
terrorist acts is important to the actors, “media attention must be gratifying to the 
terrorist….  [T]errorist strategies are adapted to acquiring maximum publicity in terms of 
timing and choice of appropriate targets of violence.”414  Neither the immediate nor the 
international communities are likely to view any attack using such a disease as being an 
“appropriate target” of violence.  Bioterrorism expert Leonard Cole describes the 
repulsion for using biological agents as weapons as a “deeply imbedded human 
inclination: we are attuned to fighting against germs, not with them.  To disturb this 
primal formula is to invite psychological dissonance.”415  Because of this, “people find 
efforts purposely to infect others repugnant.”416  A smallpox attack would almost 
certainly be universally decried as an abhorrent tactic, therefore earning little support for 
the terrorist organization’s aims. 
If terrorists themselves do not believe that it is wrong to use biological 
agents in terrorism, they may be deterred because they expect that their audience or 
supporters would have moral objections to spreading lethal contagious disease.   
Terrorism expert Jessica Stern claims that “many terrorists will shy away using these 
[WMD] weapons because they, or their constituents, consider them morally 
abhorrent.”417  As an illustration, she hypothesizes that the Irish Republican Army would 
“probably be less effective in fundraising operations on Boston Common if it employed 
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bubonic plague as a weapon.”418  Such moral implications, if present in a terrorist actor, 
could influence a decision to use conventional instead of biological weapons.419 
Not all terrorist groups, however, are affected by such moral norms; Aum 
Shinrikyo’s use of nerve gas in an attack in the Japanese subway system in 1995 shows 
that moral considerations are not always adequate deterrents.420  Nuclear terrorism expert 
S. Paul Kapur has concluded that Aum Shinrikyo’s negative goals made the group 
unsusceptible to this type of deterrent, as they “did not value the well-being of any 
particular population or territory.”421  Such moral disengagement is likely required for 
any terrorist group considering the use of WMDs.422 
Al Qaeda, too, has implied recognition of these moral norms.  Their 
statements on the topic of using WMD show realization that their use is somewhat 
exceptional, and therefore requires addition explanations and justification.  In order to 
maintain their legitimacy, the organization’s leaders have attempted to explain how the 
group is not, in fact, violating the taboo against killing with biological weapons because 
their actions are justifiable.  By including reasoning such as “it is our right to fight them 
with chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that 
have afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans’] chemical and biological 
weapons,”423 al Qaeda is acknowledging the exceptional nature of the use of chemical 
and biological agents in war. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Given the considerations of a smallpox attack’s likely impact on the terrorist 
organization and the advantages that conventional weapons offer over biological ones, it 
seems probable that a terrorist actor or group would not choose smallpox as a bioweapon 
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of choice.  Those motivated by religious ideology are not likely to want to take advantage 
of the exceptionally lethal and transmissible nature of smallpox based upon either 
religious or moral imperatives or because they are seeking exceptionally deadly or 
sensational means of attack.  Claims that these terrorists’ motivations are part of new and 
more lethal form of terrorism are exaggerated or misinterpreted.  Those terrorists who 
take into account rational decision-making factors are likely to be dissuaded from 
choosing to conduct a smallpox attack.  It is probable that motives such as group 
preservation and preferences for conventional weapons would deter these terrorists from 
choosing smallpox over other weapons.  Given these considerations, it is unlikely that a 
terrorist actor or group would make the decision to pursue smallpox weaponization as a 
candidate for a bioterrorist attack.   
Chapter IV will continue the assumption that terrorists are capable of 
weaponizing smallpox and additionally will assume that the rational considerations just 
discussed in this chapter have not deterred a terrorist from pursuing smallpox.  This 
allows Chapter IV to address the impact that domestic and international laws and 











IV. CURRENT POLICIES AND REPORTS 
I will next examine the factors likely to affect the response of the U.S. 
government if a biological attack were to occur, and whether the knowledge of 
forthcoming retaliation would be likely to deter terrorist actors from pursuing or using 
smallpox as a weapon of bioterror.  In addition to this aspect of deterrence, I will also 
consider the potential for deterrence by denial.  Government action in advance of an 
attack aimed at mitigating the consequences of smallpox bioterrorism could influence 
terrorists not to use smallpox because of the lessened chance that their objectives would 
be met.  
A. POLICIES, LAWS, AND TREATIES AGAINST BIOWARFARE 
Three major international documents address the issue of biological warfare: the 
Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention, and United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540.  Domestic laws supplement their provisions with specific 
regulations intended to make United States citizens safe from bioterrorism and to create a 
legal regime that balances this security with the need to protect legitimate scientific 
research and to protect the civil liberties of those involved.  In spite of the intent of this 
legislation, it is unlikely that the provisions of either the international or domestic laws 
are strong enough to enable prevention or to deter a terrorist actor intent on committing a 
smallpox attack.   
1. Geneva Protocol 
In 1925, the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was 
signed.  Previous treaties had prohibited the use of many forms of poison gases and 
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liquids in war, but had not banned biological warfare.424  The 1925 Protocol aimed to re-
affirm and formalize the earlier treaties’ universal condemnation and, additionally, “to 
extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.”425  Biological 
warfare was now forbidden, but cessation of research and weaponization was not called 
for.  Countries continued to develop and study both chemical and biological warfare 
agents during and after World War II.426 
By the 1960s, the domestic and international political climate had changed.  The 
United States had been accused of using biological weapons during both the Korean War 
and the Cold War.427  Critics of germ warfare had begun to criticize publically the 
government’s secret biological research programs.428  Government officials had begun to 
question whether biological warfare was necessary in light of the deterrent factor 
provided by the nation’s nuclear weapons.429  Great Britain summarized the concerns 
surrounding the indiscriminate and unpredictable nature of biological weapons in a 
proposal to limit practices related to biological warfare that was presented to the United 
Nations in July 1969.430 
In response to these concerns and the growing lack of acceptance of biological 
warfare as legitimate or necessary, President Nixon announced in November 1969 that 
the United States would “renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and 
all other methods of biological warfare.  The U.S. will confine its biological research to 
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defensive measures.”431  This was the first step in extending the belief that biowarfare 
was no longer acceptable into government policy.  However, nothing about an 
announcement from the American president prevented other countries, especially the 
Soviet Union, from continuing research and development in their own offensive 
biological weapon programs.  Although it was not brought to light until years later, it is 
believed that during this time the Soviet Union was capable at its peak of producing one 
hundred metric tons per year of smallpox virus.432  It would take more than a good-faith 
declaration from the Americans to stop such a robust Soviet program. 
2. Biological Weapons Convention 
The next step to changing biological weapons policy came in 1972, when the 
United States signed The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, which is more commonly referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC).  The States Parties and Signatories believed that it was in the best interests of the 
international community to update and supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol with more 
specific regulations. 
When the BWC was ratified in 1975, each State Party agreed “never in any 
circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain: … Microbial 
or other biological agents … of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.”433  Countries could still conduct 
research for defensive purposes, as long as it did not involve research on biological 
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weapon delivery systems, which was explicitly banned.434  The terms of the convention 
were intentionally left vague enough to remain relevant through future scientific 
advances;435 however, this left room for interpretation.  For example, in the late 1990s, 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon were both studying biological 
weapons, causing government lawyers to debate whether studying a weapon for 
defensive purposes was a violation of the 1972 BWC.436   
After the World Trade Center attacks in 2001, the international nature and 
exceptionally lethal potential of terrorism was evident.  This brought to light the need to 
take greater measures to ensure that non-state actors would not acquire nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons.437  In addition, limitations of the BWC had surfaced 
since its ratification: evaluating state parties’ compliance had proven difficult, 
information sharing between parties surrounding the effectiveness of their national 
legislation was lacking, and national laws were not all implemented using the definitions 
agreed upon in the text of the BWC.438 
3. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 
As a result, in April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1540, which made two important points clear: (1) that “all States 
shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to 
develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use”439 biological weapons 
or delivery devices; and (2) that: 
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All States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and 
enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to 
[perform the above actions,] in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as 
to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an 
accomplice, assist or finance them.440   
Because of the nature of Security Council resolutions, these provisions legally bind all 
states to adhere to these prohibitions.441  Not to fulfill its obligations would put a 
signatory in violation of international law.442  
Therefore, a state that assisted non-state actors in any form of research or 
development relating to smallpox would be acting in contravention to Resolution 1540 
and, therefore, Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter.  Such a state “could face 
a bevy of different actions by other nations, including such things as sanctions,… loss of 
good will and international capital, etc.”443  Although peaceful resolution of violations is 
the Security Council’s first resort, Article 39 of the UN Charter could be invoked under 
certain circumstances to allow for the use of force to resolve a violation.444   
Although no evidence has come to light in the international community that any 
state is in violation of Resolution 1540, the threat that a terrorist actor could research and 
develop a smallpox weapon is real.  As Chapter III makes clear, evidence from the Soviet 
Union proves that clandestine weaponization of the smallpox virus is possible, and that 
secret state sponsorship of biological weapons research has been a reality in the past.  
However, significant resources were devoted to the Soviet Union’s biological weapons 
research and development projects that might not be available to terrorist actors today.445   
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Although Resolution 1540 could be a significant factor in deterring a state from 
funding terrorist smallpox weapons, it is possible that terrorists could fund and conduct 
the required operations without state backing.  Scientific advances have made it likely 
that the smallpox virus can be genetically engineered, based on the scientific research that 
has been carried out and publicized since its eradication.446  Many legitimate laboratories 
conduct research on genetic engineering and DNA synthesis, and the same techniques 
could be applied to smallpox in laboratories that already exist.  Because the process of 
synthesizing smallpox virus DNA is thought to be technologically feasible,447 laws 
preventing a state from transferring smallpox to a non-state actor are rendered less 
important.  However, laws preventing the state from supporting and funding biological 
programs that could be used for terrorist purposes remain relevant. 
Although DNA synthesis may be able to be used to synthesize the smallpox virus 
for nefarious purposes, it can also be conducted legitimately.  The World Health 
Organization sanctioned such legitimate research in 1990.448  In the following years, a 
debate was periodically raised over whether to destroy the two remaining legal stores of 
smallpox virus.449  One reason for the virus’ stay of destruction was that synthesis of its 
DNA was incomplete: a fact that anti-destructionists claimed would leave the scientific 
community unable to adequately protect the public in the event of a smallpox 
outbreak.450  Clearly, research into DNA synthesis cannot be banned on the chance that a  
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terrorist might use it to conduct biological terrorism; however this makes the issues of 
protection and punishment more difficult from the point of view of the legal and judicial 
systems. 
Resolution 1540 was an important addition to the international legal regime for 
another reason.  For the first time, international law surrounding bioterrorism required 
more than a state’s pledge to uphold the terms of the treaty to which it was party.  By 
signing Resolution 1540, states agreed to augment their domestic legal systems with laws 
of their own that were in accordance with the terms set forth by the Security Council.  In 
effect, this shifted the matter of international bioterrorism from an international political 
matter to a domestic legislative concern.   
The 1540 Committee periodically reports to the Security Council on compliance 
with Resolution 1540.  The most recent report indicates an “upward trend in the progress 
made by States in implementing measures to prevent non-State actors from acquiring… 
biological weapons and their means of delivery.”451  As of 2011, “112 States have a 
national legal framework prohibiting the manufacture or production of biological 
weapons.”452  Ninety states have implemented legislation addressing the issue of 
biological weapons delivery and more than 100 currently have laws forbidding acting as 
an accomplice in many of the aspects of biological warfare.453  Fifty-seven states have 
enforcement measures in place that regulate licensing “for materials related to biological 
weapons as permitted activities for academic, commercial, industrial or public health 
purposes” and forty-seven have similar laws regarding genetic engineering of biological 
weapons.454  All of these numbers reflect improvement from previous reports.  The 
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Committee noted, however, that additional efforts were required to strengthen the area of 
enforcement of prohibitions surrounding non-State actors and biological weapons.455 
4. Domestic Legislation 
Domestic legislation in the U.S. had attempted to address different issues related 
to bioterrorism prior to the signing of Resolution 1540 in 2004.  In response to the 1972 
BWC, Congress passed the Biological Weapons Antiterrorism Act of 1989.456  This law 
attempted to define for the U.S. legal system the use of biological agents457 for the 
purpose of a weapon, and to make such actions illegal.458  Scientists provided input into 
the drafting of this legislation so that its final form would be less likely to cause 
confusion over whether legitimate scientific pursuits had been made illegal and so that 
legitimate laboratory practices would not be unintentionally affected.459  The legislation 
leaves to the government the crucial role of proving that a person charged with violating 
this law had not intended to use the biological agent for a legitimate purpose; the burden 
of proof does not lie with the accused to prove his or her innocent scientific intentions.460 
This legislation was proven insufficient in 1995 when an American member of a 
white supremacist group named Larry Wayne Harris successfully ordered vials of 
bubonic plague through the mail.461  When law enforcement officials were contacted 
based on suspicions surrounding his order, their investigation uncovered that he was 
insufficiently trained in the scientific practices required to handle the plague bacteria that 
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he had been storing in his car.462  In spite of the fact that he was not a microbiologist (as 
he claimed) and he did not have adequate laboratory facilities to handle the plague safely, 
law enforcement officials were unable to convict him of violating the Biological 
Weapons Antiterrorism Act of 1989 because there was no proof of his intent to use the 
bubonic plaque as a weapon.463  His claim of needing the plague for his protection could 
not be disproven by the FBI; therefore, the only charge brought against him was mail 
fraud.464 
Partly in response to the gaps in the law brought to light by the Larry Wayne 
Harris case, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was passed in 1996.465  It 
included more specific regulation about transferring and possessing certain biological 
agents because Congress had realized that “the transfer and possession of potentially 
hazardous biological agents should be regulated to protect public health and safety.”466 
The law mandated that within 120 days the Secretary of Health and Human Services must 
oversee:467  
(1) the establishment and enforcement of safety procedures for the transfer 
of [listed] biological agents,… including measures to ensure: (a) proper 
training and appropriate skills to handle such agents; and (b) proper 
laboratory facilities…; and (2) safeguards to prevent access to such agents 
for use in domestic or international terrorism or for any other criminal 
purpose.468   
By amending the existing bioterrorism legislation, Congress had recognized that 
current laws were insufficient to allow the judicial system to adequately address the cases 
being brought forth by law enforcement officials.  In response to this law, by 1997 a 
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system was in place that required shipping and receiving facilities that handled the listed 
biological agents to register with the federal government before the transfer of any of the 
agents could take place.469   
In spite of this additional regulation, the laws concerning possession of these 
agents remained unchanged; the system enacted in 1997 required the facilities to register 
the transfer of agents, but registration for the personnel who used them was still not 
required.470  Partly in response to the fact that in spite of the new legislation a person 
could still only be charged with violation if it could be proven that he or she intended to 
use the biological agents as a weapon, President Clinton proposed legislation entitled the 
21st Century Law Enforcement and Public Safety Act in 1999.471  The president’s 
proposed legislation was written with the intent to:  
Keep dangerous biological agents and toxins out of the wrong hands by: 
barring unauthorized possession and transfer of harmful biological agents; 
holding accountable persons who knowingly disregard public health and 
safety when handling deadly toxins; making it a crime to perpetrate a hoax 
involving biological agents; and prohibiting violent felons and fugitives 
from possessing dangerous biological agents.472 
Congressional hearings devoted to the issues raised in this bill pointed out the negative 
implications of President Clinton’s proposed measures, citing the careful balance that is 
required between safety and over-regulation.473   
The American Society for Microbiology, a large and well-respected professional 
science organization, testified to Congress that regulations of the type that President 
Clinton detailed could “pose a threat to biomedical or other life sciences research and 
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clinical diagnostic activities that are essential for public health.”474  Mr. Ronald Atlas, 
Co-chair of the Task Force on Biological Weapons Control, testified to the same 
Committee that the “unintended consequences [of the proposed legislation] could stifle 
the free exchange of microbial cultures among members of the scientific community and 
could even drive some microbiologists away from important areas of research.”475 It was 
his professional opinion that such regulation aimed at the prevention of bioterrorism, 
“instead of enhancing global security, could prove detrimental to that goal if scientists 
can no longer obtain authenticated cultures.  A key point is that natural infectious 
diseases are a greater threat than bioterrorism.”476  Because agreement could not be 
reached within the legislative branch about how to phrase the proposed legislation to take 
these concerns into account, thereby balancing the need for security with the need for 
allowing legitimate scientific pursuits, the 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public 
Safety Act was never passed.477 
The need to re-address the issue of bioterrorism law was made clear in 2001 after 
two highly visible incidents showed that terrorism was a threat to the American public: 
the World Trade Center attacks and the following week’s anthrax mailings.  In October 
2001, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, also known as the USA PATRIOT Act, was 
signed.478  This legislation addresses the issue of possessing biological agents in a way 
that previous legislation had not: “Whoever knowingly possesses any biological agent… 
of a type or in a quantity that… is not reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, 
bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose, shall be fined, … imprisoned not more than 
ten years, or both.”479  For the first time, possession was addressed in the domestic legal 
framework.  
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A second important section of the USA PATRIOT Act defines special categories 
of “restricted persons”480 for whom it is illegal to possess or transfer any of the select 
biological agents, even for reasons that are otherwise lawful.481  The categories of 
restricted persons were taken from the U.S. Code that lists the categories of persons who 
are banned from purchasing firearms and ammunition.482  Several examples of the 
categories the USA PATRIOT Act uses to define restricted persons include any 
individual who: 
Has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year;…is an unlawful user of any controlled 
substance; … has been committed to any mental institution;…is an alien 
(other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who is a 
national of a country as to which the Secretary of State… has made a 
determination… that such a country has repeatedly provided support for 
acts of international terrorism.483 
At the same time that some were raising concerns over whether this aspect of the 
legislation went too far in the name of security, “approximately sixty percent of 
[homeland security poll] respondents thought it was necessary to sacrifice certain civil 
liberties to combat terrorism.”484   
In light of these regulations, there is concern surrounding balancing protection 
from potential future terrorist acts with protection of basic constitutional freedoms.  For 
example, the fact that employers would be made to “inquire about, or even to investigate 
the mental health and medical history of their employees”485 caused some to fear that 
civil liberties were being eroded.  Faculty at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) expressed concern that regulations not be extended to foreign nationals because 
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such restrictions would violate the institution’s principles, as well as potentially causing 
the school to re-evaluate whether research into agents covered under these laws was 
worth pursuing.486  It was the finding of an MIT faculty committee appointed to study the 
issue of regulating scientific research that “the well-being of our nation will ultimately be 
damaged if education, science, and technology suffer as a result of any practices that 
indiscriminately discourage or limit the open exchange of ideas.”487 
At the same time that MIT was debating the impact of the law on scientific 
pursuits, the University of Connecticut was experiencing the impact first-hand.  In 2002, 
the USA PATRIOT Act was used for the first time as a basis for charges surrounding 
bioterrorism.  A Czech-born graduate student from the University of Connecticut named 
Tomas Foral was charged with possessing anthrax that was not being used for legitimate 
research.  What his lawyers describe as a miscommunication within the laboratory about 
where to store which test tubes when cleaning and organizing laboratory freezers resulted 
in formal charges against Foral, which could have resulted in a trial and ten years in 
prison.488  Because his research was unrelated to the anthrax vials that he relocated, his 
case was determined not to meet the PATRIOT Act’s exemption for bona fide scientific 
pursuits.489  This case highlights the “treacherous legal landscape”490 that now surrounds 
scientific research because of the newly enacted domestic legislation.   
In light of the new legal landscape formed by the bioterrorism portion of the 
PATRIOT Act and in response to the charges against the student described above, other 
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scholarly institutions have expressed concern over whether they will be able to continue 
research into the biological agents regulated by legislation.491  Because of the potential 
for run-ins with the law and the necessity of demonstrating legitimate research if 
questioned, it is possible that scientific institutions would have cause to re-evaluate 
whether the costs of conducting research into the regulated biological agents is now too 
high to merit the gains.  Cessation of legitimate research was not the intent of the 
legislation, and the consequences of abandoning the pursuit of knowledge could be 
grave.492  Although scientists recognize the need for safe practices and regulations to 
enforce them, some have said that they “are concerned that recently enacted measures 
may go too far and hinder research.”493    
Conversely, others predict that the USA PATRIOT Act’s greater regulation will 
not cause the detrimental effects to scientific research or to the academic institutions as 
claimed above.  The President of the American Biological Safety Association believes 
that research will actually be enhanced.  She predicts that “[w]hen the bioterrorism 
dollars start flowing, those institutes that are compliant with this new law are going to be 
able to expand their programs tremendously, and those that don't have programs will 
want to start them.”494  She also points out that the scientific community is familiar with 
operating within government regulations, such as the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration laws, of which a violation can bring about similar fines and prison 
sentences as the USA PARTIOT Act.495 
These issues came to light in the recent debate surrounding whether scientists 
should be prevented from publishing their research on genetically altered H5N1 avian flu 
virus.  Their alterations made the virus deadlier and more transmissible between ferrets, 
and some scientists expressed concern that publishing the details of their methods could 
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unnecessarily inform one who wished to alter the disease to spread among humans.496  
The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSSAB)––a federal committee 
designed to oversee biological research that could impact national security––
recommended that certain details not be published.497  Scientists objected not only to the 
act of censorship, but also to the fact that withholding details of the research from 
legitimate scientists prevents others from conducting research to protect the public.498  In 
this case, the scientists and the NSSAB reached an agreement: the research would be 
published, but in a modified form to mitigate the risk of misuse, and a system would be 
set up to securely share the redacted information with legitimate researchers.499 
In addition to the impact of the legislation on science and research, one must also 
consider its ability to enable law enforcement officials to protect public safety in a 
manner that will allow their investigations to be upheld within the judicial system.  
Although the Tomas Foral case reads to some like a case of overzealous agents from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on an anti-science crusade, it must be considered 
that the mandate of law enforcement is to protect the public by enforcing the legislation 
that Congress has enacted.  The FBI began its investigation of Foral only after an 
anonymous tip received by local police (in conjunction with an anthrax death sixty miles 
away) led them to his laboratory, where he was found to possess frozen stores of anthrax.  
There was sufficient cause to open an investigation.  This case exemplifies the need to 
carefully write the laws in order to allow for a balance between constraining scientists 
and protecting the public. 
Although one method that enforcers of the law have determined would help with 
this protection is “placing those who are allowed access [to certain biological agents] 
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under greater scrutiny,”500 this might not be in the interest of the balance mentioned 
above.  The advance investigation of scientific personnel who seek to work with the 
regulated agents raises additional issues pertaining to Constitutional rights.   
In an attempt to address this, and thereby strengthen the domestic biological 
terrorism legal regime, Congress passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.  This law requires greater oversight of the 
registration that is required in order to lawfully possess or transfer select biological 
agents.501  It makes the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Attorney 
General responsible for verifying that such registrants have “a legitimate need to handle 
or use such agents”502 and also includes provisions to protect against the undue 
disclosure of information from the registration databases.503  Criminal penalties apply for 
transferring biological agents to unregistered persons and for possessing an agent without 
being registered.504 
Although these measures will likely hinder terrorists in their pursuit of biological 
agents that can be a danger to society, it remains possible that either a lawfully registered 
person could commit illegal actions with a regulated biological agent or that a terrorist 
could falsely obtain a legitimate registration.  Because of this, other safeguards must be in 
place.  There must also be a place within the legal framework that allows for 
investigations into suspicious laboratories. 
Because legitimate laboratories need not be exceptionally and obviously different 
from laboratories used for terrorist purposes, it is difficult to determine when research 
that could lead to an attack might be being conducted.  This raises the critical tension 
between bona fide scientific pursuits and illegal practices; there is a fine line between the 
two when it comes to determining whether an investigation can be conducted into the 
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intent of the research and use of the equipment contained in a potentially suspect 
laboratory.  In spite of this difficulty, and the fact that it could leave room for planning a 
terrorist attack, current domestic legislation is written so that a crime must be committed 
or justification must be had in order to conduct an investigation.  These factors make 
prevention of bioterrorism difficult in spite of the laws that are in place. 
In order to avoid the perceived censorship that additional regulation could bring, 
many scientists and academic institutions have taken voluntary precautions to consider 
whether their research––if published––could be applied for terrorist purposes.505  Gerald 
Esptein points out:  
Measures to foster a community sense of responsibility and accountability 
in biological research would have the greatest payoff: an ethic that 
encourages informal review and discussion of proposed activities, that 
heightens an obligation to question activities of other researchers that may 
seem inappropriate…and that engages in a continuing dialogue with 
members of the national security community.506 
Additional self-regulation comes both from the inherent concern for safety 
practices within the scientific community and the incentives to avoid the constraints 
related to formal legal regulation.  Laboratory guidelines for the safe handling of harmful 
biological agents and internal requirements for safety measures are ways that the 
scientific community has voluntarily chosen to strengthen its own safety procedures 
without legal regulation.  Kathleen Vogel has studied these regulatory practices in the 
former Soviet biological research facilities (including the facility that houses smallpox).  
She has found that: 
All research work involving dangerous pathogens must be conducted in 
paired team operations, with no fewer than two persons.  Work in the 
evening and night, as well as on days off and holidays, is possible only 
with the written permission of the institution director, and two persons are  
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present.  Also, transfer of pathogen cultures in containers from one section 
to another is only by persons cleared to work with dangerous pathogens, 
and with an escort.507 
In both the Russian and American maximum containment laboratories, biocontainment 
practices for dealing with high-risk pathogens like smallpox provide safety and decrease 
the risk of unauthorized access.  Some of these practices include: access restrictions (both 
through physical guards and identity verification procedures), contained workspaces, and 
rigorous training standards and safety protocols.508  These standards significantly limit 
access to smallpox to a limited number of qualified scientists. 
The domestic and international laws and treaties alone are not likely to be 
sufficient deterrents to bioterrorists; however, having them in place remains important.  
By creating the expectation that smallpox bioterrorism will not be tolerated, these treaties 
and laws strengthen norms against bioterror and empower law enforcement officials to 
address security threats.  Because these measures are not wholly adequate in deterring 
non-state actors, however, other means of deterrence can be used as supplements.  One 
way to approach this is to convince the would-be biological terrorists that the cost 
associated with the retribution or retaliation that would occur is greater than the potential 
aims to be achieved by launching an attack using smallpox.  Another way is to enact 
measures that have a deterrent effect by way of denying the terrorist organization its 
supporters or the benefits it aims to achieve.  The following sections will discuss these 
measures in greater detail. 
B. DETERRENCE BY RETRIBUTION OR PUNISHMENT 
Some have argued that international agreement to treat possession of smallpox as 
a crime against humanity would be an effective deterrent.  D.A. Henderson, one of the 
world’s leading experts on smallpox epidemiology, claims that an effective policy would 
be “for the World Health Assembly and United Nations General Assembly to take the 
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formal position that after the designated date of smallpox destruction, any scientist or any 
country found to possess smallpox virus would be deemed guilty of a crime against 
humanity.”509  This gesture would set the bar high enough that the international 
community would have a means of response; international courts would have a legal 
basis for action, and this fact could have the added benefit of deterrence.   
A similar strategy, indirect deterrence, focuses on deterring supporters of 
terrorism––either states or individuals––from providing assistance rather than deterring 
the actual terrorists themselves.510  In the case of smallpox bioterrorism, this could be 
applied by making it known that supporters of any aspects of acquisition, production, or 
weaponization would be held liable by the international community. 
While terrorism and deterrence scholars agree that such deterrence by punishment 
or indirect deterrence of terrorism supporters are valid policy options for deterring states, 
some question the utility of such strategies in deterring non-state actors.511  Non-state 
actors may not be as likely to be deterred by retaliation as states, and in any case it can be 
difficult to retaliate against groups that are not tied to a specific territory or who do not 
have anything that can be held at risk.512  For this reason, an increased focus on 
deterrence by denial strategies is evident in deterrence studies today.513 
C. DETERRENCE BY DENIAL 
Recent deterrence literature has examined the changes in strategy that are required 
to deal with the asymmetric threats posed by non-state actors.514  One strategy that has  
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been identified is “increasing the probability that individual attacks will fail.”515  Called 
deterrence by denial, this involves convincing the would-be terrorists that their attacks 
will likely be unsuccessful.516   
In order to make this strategy applicable to smallpox, it could be useful to 
publicize the futility of the effort.  For example, if the significant number of hurdles to be 
overcome are known to terrorists, they might consider their efforts potentially wasted due 
to the unlikely chance of being able to successfully complete all the prerequisite steps to 
an attack.517  This strategy, however, requires publication of an accurate threat 
assessment in order to act as an effective deterrent. 
Additionally, if terrorists are aware that their attack is not guaranteed to spread 
smallpox uncontrollably or, alternatively, that it could spread to their own constituents, 
they might be deterred from using smallpox.  Promoting and publicizing norms against 
the use of biological weapons could also increase the chances that constituencies 
terrorists claim to represent might be expected to condemn the use of smallpox.  Called 
deterrence by delegitimization or by counter-narrative, this approach seeks to “use 
information and discourse to convince… [a terrorist group] that WMD terrorism will 
cause a backlash from within its intended support base.”518 
Another means of deterrence that is thought to be a valuable counterterrorist 
strategy is deterrence by mitigation.519  By denying “the immediate consequences 
terrorists anticipate and desire,” the thought is that terrorists might reconsider their 
methods.520  In an attempt to achieve this, authorities have implemented consequence 
mitigation and prevention measures such as improving public health capabilities and 
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taking measures to reduce the severity or effects of an attack.521  These are considered 
valuable strategies because of the two-fold benefit they provide.522  In addition to the 
deterrence effect, these measures also increase preparation and response capability. 
Government offices are aware of these benefits of the consequence management 
strategy for biosecurity.523  In 2009, the Obama Administration summarized that it 
intended to build capacity in this area of mitigating the consequences of bioterror attacks 
through the following measures: 
Ensure that decision makers have the information and communication 
tools they need to manage disease outbreaks by linking healthcare 
providers, hospitals, and public health agencies.  A well-planned, well-
rehearsed, and rapidly executed epidemic response can dramatically 
diminish the consequences of biological attacks.524 
This strategy, more than deterrence through a legal regime, is the main strategy of 
biosecurity today.525  It can be applied to smallpox bioterrorism by publicizing the facts 
that the U.S. is prepared to respond to and to contain an outbreak.526  Again, this strategy 
can only be successful when accurate portrayals of the threat from smallpox and the 
country’s ability to respond effectively are spread. 
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Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines (March 20, 2003) 
http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/ (accessed February 11, 2012); Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response. “Smallpox Fact Sheet: 




Initially conceived along the lines of an arms control regime and gradually 
appended and updated with more domestic laws throughout the years, the current legal 
regime remains insufficient to address the threat posed by bioterrorism.  Neither 
international nor domestic laws are ideally suited to address the complexities brought 
about by the dual-use of many aspects of modern science.  The cases brought forth under 
the current laws show that common scientific research is being mistaken for illegal 
practices; clearly American domestic law requires improvement.  Improvement, not 
simply the addition of more laws, is required in order to further protection against today’s 
scientific terrorist threats such as the threat posed by smallpox as a bioweapon.   
A terrorist is unlikely to be swayed by the fact that his actions are in violation of 
the domestic or international law, because by the fact of being a terrorist he has forgone 
his identity as a law-abiding citizen.  Threat of a fine no greater than $2,000,000 and a 
25-years-to-life prison sentence for possessing or using the smallpox virus527 is not likely 
to be an effective deterrent for a terrorist who is already willing to risk his life by 
working to weaponize a deadly virus.  Therefore, it is likely that the laws in place are 
most beneficial for the framework they provide for guiding law enforcement and judicial 
policies, rather than for their deterrent effect on individual actors.  
Laws, however, are not the only tools available.  This requirement for 
improvement has been addressed partially through voluntary self-regulation measures, 
imposed by the concerned scientists and academics who work closest with the laboratory 
environment.  Improving biosecurity is accomplished by focusing on other means of 
deterrence: deterring supporters, denying terrorist aims, and preparing for the 
consequence of an attack so that bioterrorists are less able to achieve their goals. 
The following chapter will review the preceding conclusions and provide an 
overall evaluation of the threat the United States is likely to face from a bioterrorist attack 
using smallpox. 
                                                 
527 U.S. Code, Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 10, Section 175(c), “Variola Virus.” 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The commonly supposed level of threat that smallpox poses as an agent of 
bioterror is likely higher than the actual threat.  A careful study of the factors that indicate 
whether terrorists will likely use Variola as a weapon reveals that there are probably not 
groups or individuals who possess the necessary combination of resources, capabilities, 
motivations, and intentions to make smallpox a realistically impending threat.  If such a 
bioterrorist considered pursuing smallpox weaponization in spite of those improbabilities, 
there remains the possibility that the biosecurity measures that are in place in the U.S. 
today would deter him from proceeding with a smallpox attack because of a belief that 
the severity of his attack would be mitigated.  
Chapter I introduced the gap in the risk assessment of a smallpox attack and the 
impact that government preparedness exercises, the debate over vaccination, and media 
coverage of the topic of smallpox have on the perception of the threat of attack.  
Exaggerations, generalizations, and misperceptions cause a belief that the level of risk is 
higher than it actually is.  Although smallpox’s release into the world today would have 
terrible consequences, this does not elevate the actual level of risk. 
Chapter II demonstrated that acquiring, synthesizing, reproducing, weaponizing, 
and disseminating smallpox are challenging both in the resources and in the scientific 
expertise that are required.  Although the characteristics of the disease make it suitable to 
consider as a bioweapon, those challenges are significant enough to be considered 
prohibitive barriers for many potential bioterrorists.  The case of the Soviet Union is 
unique in the level of state support that was devoted to the program and to maintaining its 
secrecy.  Furthermore, an analysis of presence of suspected smallpox weaponization 
programs shows that no state or non-state actors can be said––with certainty––to possess 
the virus or programs to weaponize it.   
Chapter III revealed that religious ideology is not a likely motivation for the use 
of smallpox.  The exceptionally lethal and transmissible nature of smallpox would 
probably cause rational decision-makers to prefer other weapons due to considerations 
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such as organizational survival.  These terrorists are not likely to resort to an attack with 
consequences as severe, as widespread, and as uncontrollable as unleashing a smallpox 
epidemic would be.  Rational actors are also likely to conclude that conventional 
weapons (and even biological weapons other than smallpox) are easier and safer to use 
and deploy, and are more likely to be successful than smallpox.   
Chapter IV demonstrated that current domestic and international policies, laws, 
and treaties are most likely insufficient deterrents to individual terrorists considering 
bioterror in general.  However, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 does create the 
international expectation that bioterrorism should be addressed by domestic legislation.  
Furthermore, states are likely to be deterred from supporting smallpox bioterrorism due 
to the international disdain that would result if the support were discovered.  Because 
violation of Resolution 1540 also violates Chapter VII of the UN Charter, states that 
value their international standing are unlikely to contribute to smallpox weaponization 
programs.   
Compared to other potential bioweapons, smallpox’s status as an eradicated 
disease with only two internationally recognized locations for its storage should make it 
easier to distinguish nefarious from legitimate research and to apply criminal charges 
only when appropriate.  The current legal regime alone, though, is unlikely to be 
successful as a deterrent to bioterrorism.  Although there have been improvements to 
domestic and international laws, deterrence through punishment is less likely to be 
effective than deterrence by denial.  Laws that enhance biosecurity through consequence 
mitigation and prevention are measures that are are more likely to prevent a terrorist 
attack using smallpox. 
It is evident that the public is aware of the potential danger presented by a 
smallpox outbreak; however, based upon the study of terrorist motivation, decision-
making, capabilities, and factors of deterrence, this concern is greater than is warranted.  
The threat from terrorist actors pursuing smallpox as a weapon of bioterrorism is one that 
the United States is unlikely to face. 
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A. HOW CAN THE THREAT BE BETTER ASSESSED? 
1. Recognize that Medical Expertise does not Equal Terrorism Expertise 
The risk from an epidemic of smallpox itself and from the likelihood of terrorists 
attempting to start such an epidemic are two entirely different calculations.  The threat 
picture is often muddled when scientists—recognized experts in epidemiology or 
virology—combine their assessment of the medical aspects of an epidemic and the 
resultant public health issues (which they are qualified to give) with a prediction of the 
likelihood that terrorists will choose this method of attack (which is often based upon 
speculation).   
For example, the authors of “Smallpox as a Biological Weapon: Medical and 
Public Health Management” include some of the world’s experts on smallpox, among 
other public health, emergency management, and communicable disease professionals.  
Their conclusions within their respective fields of expertise, published in the Journal of 
the American Medical Association, are undoubtedly well-founded.  When they stray into 
the realm of predictions of terrorism, exemplified by conclusions such as “the threat of an 
aerosol release of smallpox is real and the potential for catastrophic scenario is great,”528 
their legitimacy and credibility in the world of science are projected into the field of 
terrorism.  This undoubtedly contributes to acceptance of their predictions of impending 
bioterror attacks.  It is important to realize that one’s status as an expert in the medical 
aspects of smallpox does not automatically correlate to being an expert in the field of 
terrorist activities. 
2. Recognize that Protections are in Place 
Since 2001, the United States has spent approximately $60 billion on 
biodefense.529  Funding has been applied directly toward preparation for a smallpox 
attack.  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have devoted time, attention, and 
                                                 
528 Henderson et al., “Smallpox as a Biological Weapon,” 2136. 
529 Leonard Cole, “Bioterrorism: Still a Threat to the United States,” Combating Terrorism Center 
Sentinel 5, no. 1 (January 2012): 9. 
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resources to develop a detailed a Smallpox Response Plan that would lessen the severity 
of a smallpox outbreak, in the unlikely event that an attack is carried out.530  Enough 
smallpox vaccine is stored in the national stockpile to vaccinate every person in the 
United States.531  Additional preparedness measures include education of medical 
professionals and first responders, stocking vaccinia immune globulin, and immunizing 
hospital workers.532    Even though smallpox could spread before it was identified, ring 
vaccination and/or mass vaccination strategies could contain an outbreak.533  These 
factors demonstrate that in the (unlikely) event that a terrorist did succeed in conducting a 
smallpox attack, measures are in place to mitigate the attack’s severity and the virus’ 
spread.  Though an attack could have awful consequences for those infected, there are 
adequate measures in place to implement response and recovery efforts on a national 
scale. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
In light of these assessments, there is room for improvement in the manner in 
which smallpox bioterrorism is addressed.  Rather than projecting an inflated sense of the 
likelihood that terrorists will conduct an attack with smallpox, government officials, 
academics, and the media should endeavor to emphasize the challenges that have been 
identified in the previous chapters.  By publicizing the message that acquiring, producing, 
weaponizing, and disseminating smallpox are realistically quite difficult––rather than 
sending the opposite message by repeating the inflated threat assessment that these 
processes are simple––terrorists might be less inclined to choose this tactic.   
                                                 
530 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response, 
Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines (March 20, 2003) 
http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/ (accessed February 11, 2012). 
531 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response. 
“Smallpox Fact Sheet: Vaccine Overview,” http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/facts.asp 
(accessed March 1, 2012). 
532 Hugh Pennington, “Public Health Reviews: Smallpox and Bioterrorism,” Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization 81, no.10 (October 2003), 764.  
http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0042-
96862003001000014&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en (accessed March 1, 2012). 
533 Edward Kaplan, “Preventing Second-Generation Infections in a Smallpox Bioterror Attack,” 
Epidemiology 15, no. 3 (May 2004): 268–269. 
 115
Al Qaeda letters have identified that these types of emphases do impact their 
choice of tactics.  In a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Muhammad Atef dated April 15, 
1999, Zawahiri wrote that despite the “extreme danger” posed by biological and chemical 
weapons, “we only became aware of them when the enemy drew our attention to them by 
repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be produced simply with easily available 
materials.”534  By making a concerted effort in government and media references to 
emphasize and disseminate the true nature of challenges related to smallpox terrorism, it 
is possible that future potential terrorists would receive the message that smallpox would 
be neither easy to acquire nor simple to use in a terrorist attack. 
Increasing awareness of the actual threat assessment of smallpox bioterrorism can 
help to counteract the tendency to assume that because smallpox is a terrible scourge it 
follows that terrorists are likely to use it in an attack.  If future government exercises, 
academic reviews of whether to destroy the remaining stocks of the virus, and public 
health and vaccination policy debates send a uniformly accurate message of the actual 
threat posed by smallpox as a weapon of bioterror, it would greatly benefit bioterrorism 
preparedness efforts and it would contribute to establishing a more accurate level of 
public concern for the disease. 
Communication at all levels of the public health infrastructure is necessary to 
create a community of support for spreading an accurate threat assessment.  Agencies 
specializing in public health, infectious diseases, biosecurity, and emergency 
management are best suited to play a lead role in organizing and implementing the 
publication of correct threat information from medical and biosecurity points of view; 
however, their initiatives cannot stand alone.  Their efforts must be supported on a 




                                                 
534 Alan Cullison, “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” The Atlantic, September 2004.  
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/09/inside-al-qaeda-rsquo-s-hard-drive/3428/ (accessed 
February 3, 2012). 
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Local, state, and federal integration is required in order to widely and effectively 
disseminate a message that counteracts scare tactics and inflated or inaccurate threat 
assessments.  Framing the threat posed by smallpox bioterrorism accurately is a key 
policy goal that should be implemented now in order to spread a better understanding of 
the factors that inform the question “should we be concerned?” 
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